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After the First World War, Britain’s economy and security depended on imper al 
cooperation for reconstruction. Yet, the war and the culture based on the League of 
Nations and its principles of self-determination and internationalism challenged 
efforts to strengthen imperial unity. Imperialists had to re-envision a more inclusive 
idea of empire in the midst of nationalist uprisings abroad and labor unrest at home. 
By analyzing circulated propaganda and speeches about the League, this thesis 
traces the efforts of British political thinkers who used the League’s princi les to 
manage the domestic discontent that threatened unity. It demonstrates how they tried 
to relate the League’s principles to the ordinary Britisher’s historical commitment to 
internationalism and imperial humanitarianism. Invoking social psychology, 
imperialists tapped into a universal interest in the League to re-legitimize the British 
Empire and establish a more enduring psychological imperial unity between the 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction: A British League of Nations 
 
 
The First World War was a watershed moment in British imperial history. The 
human cost of war made many people in Britain and the empire disinclined to 
managing imperial defense across the globe, let alone be a party to supporting further 
efforts to unite the empire. Widespread strikes among workers and ex-servicemen 
illustrated a general desire for the government to invest its resources in domestic 
reconstruction instead of the imperial projects.1 The idea of a league of nations 
conflicted with the violent and unequal realities of late nineteenth-century imperial 
culture even as the partitioning of mandated territories by the League of Nati ns 
increased the empire’s size.2 Furthermore, for a war fought in the name of “self-
determination” and for a League of Nations developed to protect this idea, the British
Empire also had to manage the growing dissonance between its own history of liberal 
humanitarianism and its failure to live up to it.   
Britain was faced with establishing new ideological relationships with its 
empire well before June 28, 1919, when the Covenant of the League of Nations 
ratified new theories for international diplomacy. Addressing the Royal Colonial 
Institute in April 1919 on the state of the empire after the war, Viscount Milner 
reassured his audience that “the Empire will be, in fact already is, a League of 
Nations, whether or not it is embraced in a greater but less closely compacted 
                                                
1 Keith Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 1918-22 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), 12. 
 
2 From here on after, the League of Nations will periodically be referred to the League.    
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league.”3 Milner sought to redefine a relationship between Britain and its colonies 
that had lost its ideological luster over the course of the war by comparing the British 
Empire with Woodrow Wilson’s vision for a “new world order.”  
Discussions between Sir Edward Grey’s British foreign office and Woodrow 
Wilson were underway in attempts to devise a peace proposal that could end the 
diplomatic policies that many had thought caused the First World War, even as it was 
starting. The war reignited a long held liberal-radical debate in Britain about having a 
foreign policy based on a federation of nations that, while alluding to William 
Gladstone, had its intellectual origins going as far back as Kant.4 This thesis attempts 
to uncover how British statesmen and ideologues tried to craft a functional and 
sustainable idea of the British Empire that could be compatible with the untested 
broader principles agreed upon by the Signatories of the League of Nation’s 
Covenant. What role did democracy as a League ideal and a contested reality at home
play in postwar discussions about the empire? Unable to justify an empire based 
solely on national self-interest, overt racial, economic, and political control, how did 
these British intellectuals and politicians wed imperial nationalism with the League’s 
liberal internationalism? This thesis builds upon recent scholarship that has begun to 
investigate the role that the League of Nations played in the debate over imperial 
sovereignty and the legitimacy of a liberal imperialism that developed within the 
empire between 1918 and 1926.   
                                                
3 Alfred Milner, “The British League of Nations,” United Empire The Royal Colonial Institute Journal 
X, no. 5 (May 1919): 223. 
 
4 George W. Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and 
International Organization, 1914-1919 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 6. 
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After the war, no politician or intellectual could ignore the effect that the 
League had on imperial affairs. Throughout the League of Nations negotiations, 
British elites clashed with the Wilsonian idea of “self-determination.” Some 
imperialists thought that it threatened Britain’s eminent place in international affairs 
and threatened to eliminate the lingering bargaining chip used to pacify the growing 
nationalist movements throughout the empire.5 This was especially so in regards to 
Wilson’s “Point 5” that argued for “impartial adjustment of colonial claims.”6 While 
“Atlanticists” such as Robert Cecil saw Anglo-American cooperation important to the 
reconstruction of British and world order, some Dominion leaders disagreed. 
Dominion leaders such as Robert L. Borden of Canada and General Jan Christiaan 
Smuts of South Africa disliked Wilson’s liberal internationalism and the Leagu ’s 
interventionist policies in Europe. They thought the League would weaken Britain’s 
preeminence in world affairs.7   
The League of Nations embodied a set of principles, “self-determination” 
foremost among them, which threatened the legitimacy of empire by exposing the 
hypocrisy of turn of the century imperial policy. The British Prime Minister, David 
Lloyd George was the first person to articulate publically the liberal aims of a postwar 
                                                
5 I am using the term “imperialist” here, and within this thesis, in the broadest sense of the term. It will 
denote individuals in politics who were persistently interested in empire even though these people wer
interested in it for a variety of reasons. These reasons and commitments to empire were not uniform 
and these often went beyond political reasons. As Andrew Thompson notes, “imperialists can only be 
said to be of a like mind in the way in which they conceived empire as a grand alliance of British 
settler states.” Andrew S. Thompson Imperial Britain The Empire in British Politics c.1880-1932, 
(London: Pearson Education Limited, 2000), 188. With that in mind, I use imperialists as a general 
term for intellectuals (political or not) who find some inherent value in the empire or imperial unity. 
 
6“President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points,” in The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, 
codirectors William C. Fray and Lisa A. Spar (New Haven, CT: Yale Law School, 2008) 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp ; Zara S. Steiner, The Lights that Failed,  New 
York; Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005), 43-44.   
 
7 Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations, 76.  
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diplomacy even though President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech is best known 
for introducing “self-determination” to the world. Lloyd George proposed a postwar 
diplomacy based on “self-determination or the consent of the governed” in a speech 
delivered to a Trade Unionist audience on January 5, 1918,8 Despite this, he was not 
necessarily reflecting Britain’s own imperial policy. Only days befor  Lloyd 
George’s speech on January 2, 1918, Annie Besant, the President of India’s National 
Congress criticized Britain’s imperial policies that would not grant India home rule. 
She argued that “the greatest injury done to Indians by British rule was to deprive 
them of the natural instinct of all free peoples, the feeling of inherent right to self-
determination, to be themselves…this is the freedom for which the Allies were 
fighting; this is democracy, the spirit of the age.”9 This nationalist sentiment, while 
more pronounced in the non-white dependencies such as India, was of equal concern 
for the white dominions hoping to obtain their due compensation for their alignment 
with the empire during the war. 
If the clamor for self-determination had not compromised the idea of imperial 
sovereignty then the popular enthusiasm for the League of Nations and what it 
envisioned for the British people during the postwar reconstruction certainly did. The 
British people were yearning for peace and were exhausted from four years of 
government-backed misinformation, rising casualties, and radical changes in all areas 
                                                
8 Quoted in Ibid. 61. This speech was written in collaboration with Jan Smuts and Robert Cecil as the 
War Cabinet’s response to the Labour Party’s “Memorandum on War Aims” delivered to the Trade 
Unionist’s Congress on December 28, 1918. It aimed to maintain the support of a public opinion 
increasingly uninspired by the war-aims of the War C binet and who were swept up by Wilson’s 
liberal internationalism during the last year of the war.  
 
9 “'The Case for India.' Mrs. Besant's Address to the National Congress,” New York Times, January 2, 
1918, 5.  
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of their social life.10 The League of Nations idea became part of a larger popular 
culture in Britain that disliked the idea of war and wished the government would 
change its foreign policies. Thus, for the first decade after the First World War, the 
idea of the League of Nations became one of the central themes through which the 
public discussion of the empire was organized in Britain. 
Inside the classroom, the League of Nations idea was a theme that transcended 
the boundaries of class, age, and gender. Recalling, for instance, her summer spent a 
Workers’ Educational Association (WEA) summer school, an adult working class 
woman warmly remembered the excitement when her class “argued over Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points…” 11 This idea was also part of sponsored lectures in private 
universities and the new education curriculum developed by elementary and 
secondary school teachers.   
A whole public debate and culture emerged around the League of Nations idea 
even outside the classroom. It was the subject in newspapers of all persuasions, 
working class magazines such as The Labour Magazine, more highbrow publications 
such as The Statesman and The Contemporary Review, to the widely popular satirical 
weeklies such as Punch. In fact, League of Nations activists and supporters 
encouraged the creation of a whole popular culture based on the League of Nations 
                                                
10 J. M Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 30. 
 
11 Quoted in, Jonathan Rose, The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classe (New Haven: Yale 




idea. They circulated League themed children’s books, and sponsored League themed 
films, plays, and pageants at popular music halls and theaters.12   
The widespread appeal of the idea of a league of nations, and in particular the 
efforts of the League of Nation Union (an organization that circulated a vast amount 
of leaflets and pamphlets, and sponsored many popular events, films, and reading 
groups), mobilized a now more widely enfranchised public opinion around the ideas 
of internationalism and pacifism. The membership of the League of Nations Union 
between October 1918 and December 1926 demonstrates this new Zeitgeist or “spirit 
of the age.” From the League of Nations Union’s formation in October 1918, it grew 
from 3,217 members to over half a million (587,224) during this period with 2,400 
branches across the United Kingdom.13  
The Covenant was central to the League of Nation’s plan for preventing war. 
The Covenant intended to replace the imperial “balance of power” with a new system 
of international security based on set “obligations of members, the rules for the
                                                
12 There is no known scholarly work that delves into this creation of a whole popular culture based on 
the League of Nations idea. League themed films were widely shown and attended (as reported in 
newspapers such at The Times) and League themed Anglican and Non-conformist sermons were 
republished in the League’s pamphlets. In fact, children in particular were prime targets of this mass 
League of Nations propaganda campaign. The League of Nation’s International Commission on 
Intellectual Cooperation, the International Federation of League of Nations Societies, and The League 
of Nations Union circulated pamphlets such The Teaching of World Citizenship (n.d) for educators. 
Along with the new educational scheme, League of Nations propaganda targeted children with titles 
such as Peggy and the League of Nations (1923), Wonderful League. A few pages for young readers 
about the League of Nation ( .d.), The Story of the League of Nations, Told for Young People.(1925), 
and plays such as The Family of Nations (1925) and Fighting Death, and Other Plays (1923) and 
children’s League themed play-writing competitions such “Love Conquers All” (n.d.). These 
publications and many others can be viewed in the ext nsive League of Nations Union archival 
holding located at the British Library of Political nd Economic Science, London, UK, and the 
Swarthmore Peace Collection, in Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. 
 
13 League of Nations Union, Annual Report of the Executive Committee to the General Council of the 
League of Nations Union for the year ending 31st December 1926 (London: League of Nations Union, 
May 1927), 11.; Donald S Birn, The League of Nations Union, 1918-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1981), 25. In fact, the shear strength of this organization’s campaign for the League was demonstrated 
in 1935 when over 11.5 million adults completed the “P ace Ballot” which was organized to gauge and 
demonstrate the popular support for the League.   
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settlement of disputes, and the sanctions to be applied to transgressors.”14 It intended 
to protect the rights of minorities and dependent territories which, it was argued, the 
prewar imperial states violated. The signatories of the Covenant looked to Article22 
when classifying the level of dependency within the system. The article stated:      
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late War have 
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed 
them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves 
under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied 
the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a 
sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust 
should be embodied in this Covenant.15 
  
Unlike the unwritten conventions of prewar colonialism, this article formalized an 
obligation or trust to protect and assist former colonies and territories that were once 
under the control of the now defunct empires. Even with its established assumptions 
about the world order and the Great Power’s obligation to it, the article and the 
Mandate Commission modified existing colonial arrangements by serving as a moral 
check to imperial claims.16  
 The non-political humanitarian dimensions of the League of Nations 
reinforced the principles of this Covenant. Bodies such as the International Labor 
Organization existed to help the member states “gain confidence” in the League’s 
machinery and to “make the League itself meaningful to the states by involving them 
                                                
14 Zara Steiner, The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 350.  
 
15 “Article 22.” The Covenant of the League of Nations (Including Amendments adopted to December, 
1924), in The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, c directors William C. Fray and Lisa A. Spar 
(New Haven,: Yale Law School, 2008), http://avalon.law yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22. 
From here on, this will be referred to as “Article 22.” 
 
16 Steiner, The Lights That Failed, 360. 
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continuously in its efforts.”17 Modeling itself on well established nineteenth century 
humanitarian organizations, the humanitarian segment of the League intended to 
foster international cooperation without undermining or conflicting with state 
sovereignty.    
This attention to the relationship between the League of Nations and the 
postwar imperial order is not entirely new. Historians have recently paid close
attention to the role that the British Empire’s economic, colonial, and legal motives 
influencing the League’s humanitarian efforts. One approach looks specifically at the 
high diplomatic politics of the League of Nations to trace the influence of imperial 
interests on the articulation of its policies and the execution of them. Historians such 
as Michael Callahan and Susan Pedersen have argued that the mandate system was 
itself conditioned by prior systems of colonial power.18    
Other historians have moved away from high diplomatic politics altogether to 
interrogate the various transnational humanitarian and voluntary associations that 
were limited by imperialist agendas and assumptions. Kevin Grant and Daniel
Gorman have studied popular organizations Anti-Slavery Society and the Ladies' 
National Association (known by 1915 as the Association for Moral and Social 
Hygiene). Their work demonstrates how popular prewar voluntary organizations 
often got absorbed by or served as models organizations for the League of Nations 
humanitarian organizations. The consensus of these scholars was that even though 
                                                
17 Ibid., 368. 
 
18 Michael D. Callahan, Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999); Susan Pedersen, “The Meaning of the Mandates System: 
An Argument,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 32, no. 4 (Oct-Dec. 2006): 560-82. 
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these organizations shifted away from typical strategies of imperial reform, they were 
still quite limited by imperial ideologies and conventions.19   
For those historians interested in the impact of the League of Nations on the 
imperial order itself, the mandate system and the revitalization of liberal 
internationalism are central to imperial discourses after the war. The collection of 
essays edited by Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, and Frank Trentmann in Beyond 
Sovereignty discusses the impact of the idea of internationalism and a variety of 
transnational humanitarian organizations—many of which were associated with the 
League—on the debates about sovereignty in the metropole and its colonial and 
Dominion states.20 Yet the focus for these writers is on the overriding theme of the 
transnational character of empire itself and not on the historical circumstance  that 
caused the shift in the imperial order after the war.   
Lastly, writers like Daniel Gorman and Erez Manela demonstrate how the 
League’s ideas of liberal internationalism and self-determination failed to redefine the 
imperial relationship between rulers and subjects in terms that were more equitable. 
Gorman focuses on the League of Nations Union and how the group helped foster a 
popular movement based on liberal internationalism in Britain. Yet in this analysis, he 
ignores the League’s influence on imperial relations altogether. Manela o  the other 
hand, focuses on the nationalist leaders of Egypt, India, China, and Korea and how 
Wilson’s idea of self-determination gave colonial and Mandatory peoples a language 
                                                
19 Daniel Gorman, “Empire, Internationalism, and the Campaign against the Traffic in Women and 
Children in the 1920s,” Twentieth Century British History; Kevin Grant, A Civilised Savagery: Britain 
and the New Slaveries in Africa, 1884-1926 (London, Routledge, 2005). 
 
20 Kevin Grant, Philippa Levine, Frank Trentmann, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, Empire and 
Transnationalism, c. 1860-1950 (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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to help assert political autonomy against the League’s failure.21 Y t while Gorman 
can be criticized for neglecting the empire in the League’s influence in crating a 
popular liberal internationalism, then Manela can be criticized for emphasizing the 
empire too much.  
In all these historical approaches, the relationship between interwar British 
imperialism and the League of Nations is usually regarded as the exclusive domain of 
high diplomatic and imperial politics. Yet, for both the League of Nations and 
imperial politics, public opinion was vital. After the war, the domestic and foreign 
policy decisions made by British officials were much more at the whim of class as 
well as imperial interests. This new anxiety over molding more socially and 
politically meaningful subjects of the British Empire is of particular interest because 
it is here that we can begin to reconstruct the broader cultural significance of the 
League of Nations on the imperial order at “home.”   
A particularly useful approach to studying interwar imperial culture in Br tain 
is that which focuses on the political, social, and moral theories that shaped the 
discussion of the imperial project. Rather than focus on the diplomatic or military 
significance of the League of Nations on the British Empire, this thesis is concerned 
with the larger social and cultural significance of the League of Nations on the re-
envisioning of the imperial order after the First World War. One of the most 
                                                
21 Daniel Gorman, “Liberal Internationalism, The League of Nations Union, and the Mandate System,” 
Canadian Journal of History 40, no. 3 (December 2005): 449-477; Erez Manela, The Wilsonian 
Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). For a similar approach to both of these texts, see also: R. M. Douglas, 
Michael Dennis Callahan, and Elizabeth Bishop, Imperialism on Trial: International Oversight of 
Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective (Landham:Lexington Books, 2006). This collection of essay 
explores the variety of ways in which the imperial order was challenged by the mandate and trustee 
system in the forms of the Permanent Mandate Commission created at the close of the war, and its 
successor and the United Nations Trusteeship Council. 
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provocative attempts in this vein, and one which influences this work, is that which 
seeks to understand the domestic sources of imperial ideology in Britain. John 
Mackenzie and Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose have provided a useful tableau of 
essays that describe the various popular practices, programs, and social association  
that brought the empire into the everyday consciousness of the British people during 
the late nineteenth century.22 Others like Bernard Semmel, R.J. Scally, and G.R. 
Searle have delved into the elitist ideology and socioeconomic programs that were 
created to implicitly maintain and defend imperial interests abroad in the immdiate 
prewar period.23 These scholars touch on a conscious effort to forge a unified imperial 
nationalism that would later be tested by the end of the war even though they mainly 
focus on the reform and propaganda that allied themselves with the aggressive 
imperial expansionism before the war. 
Imperial reconstruction after the war was not only dependent on the 
acquiescence of the working class, but on the wider empire accepting British rule. 
Britain’s dependence on the formal empire for economic reconstruction and 
international security contrasted with an equally growing opposition to the idea of 
Empire and its basis for rule. The League of Nations idea of civilization challenged 
established colonial rule by providing the basic language and qualifications used by 
                                                
22 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-
1960 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University, 1984); John M. MacKenzie., ed. Imperialism and 
Popular Culture (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1986); Catherine Hall and Sonya O. 
Rose, At Home With the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
23 Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform; English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895-1914 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968); G. R Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in 
British Politics and Political Thought,1899-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); G. 
R. Searle, Eugenics and Politics in Britain, 1900-1914 (Leyden: Noordhoff International Publishing, 
1976); R. J. Scally, The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition: The Politics of Social-Imperialism, 
1900-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
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dependents to demand certain rights based on those models.  
The ideology of the League of Nations in Britain developed into a profound 
and corrosive critique of an imperial order that while liberal in name, had become 
illiberal in practice. From the war, there was a questioning of the reality and the 
validity of some of the empire’s most basic social and political categories. Th  
problem created by the League’s broader themes of civilization and “self 
determination” created a crisis in meaning regarding the importance of th empire to 
the British people. Ultimately, the burgeoning public support, if not demand, for a 
League of Nations is central to explaining the urgent imperial debate surrounding 
how to define the status of the Dominions and colonies in the empire leading up to the 
1926 Imperial Conference.       
This thesis will demonstrate how British officials latched onto these attemp s 
to popularize the idea of the League of Nation and use them for their own imperial 
interests. These imperialists reinterpreted the idea of the League of Nati ns in a way 
that could justify the British Empire’s existence in the postwar world while 
simultaneously fortifying a deteriorating idea of imperial unity at home. This will be 
shown by exploring the speeches, political pamphlets, leaflets, newspapers, and books 
that shaped and informed the public’s opinion about the necessity for the League of 
Nations. Throughout Britain, there were debates and public discussions that focused 
on the meaning behind the principles of the League of Nations Covenant and how 
they should manifest themselves in policy after the war. These discussions were part 
of a much bigger debate taking place throughout the empire about the failures and 
limitations of prewar liberal imperialism. It is argued here that there was an 
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emergence of a new variation of social imperialism that was based on the League of 
Nations and all the new social theories that had emerged from the war.  
Chapter Two briefly outlines the British people’s encounters with the wider 
empire and how it shaped what was to be known as the liberal empire. It describes the 
various transformations of the British public’s obligation to the empire and to 
imperial unity. By the mid-nineteenth century, British intellectuals from a particularly 
empiricist and liberal intellectual tradition helped justify the conquest of non-
European people in the name of religion and civilization. By the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, the empire’s “civilizing” mission essentially 
turned inward. Even though in practice, the wider civilizing mission had failed, the 
idea of the empire’s humanitarian mission still had an ideological function. 
Embracing an ideology of “social imperialism,” imperialists used the idea of empire 
as an ideological focal point for aggressive social reforms and national efficiency 
policies at home. Lastly, this chapter will sketch out the problems that British 
officials encountered when challenged by the ideas presented in the League’s 
Covenant.  
Chapter Three deals with the problem of postwar democracy in British politics 
and its relationship to imperial culture. It shows how the League’s internationalist 
nature was transformed to bridge the gap between class interest and imperial interests. 
The central theme of the chapter is about the crisis in political meaning faced by 
British officials because of the decision to make the idea of “self-determination” a 
major part of the League’s mission. This brought about a questioning of the reality of 
one of the most fundamental social and imperial categories that had defined the 
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average Britisher’s place in the empire before the war. It is argued that the political 
Left used the League’s idea of internationalism to mobilize public opinion around an 
idea of empire that could address class interests while also reigniting the broader mid-
nineteenth century humanitarianism mission. These particular imperialists set out to 
challenge the existing Liberal-Conservative establishment and its failure to fulfill its 
former humanitarian obligations. By relating working class internationalism to this 
more universal ideal, these intellectuals and politicians used this common interest to 
integrate a formerly disenfranchised class into a British society. By linking the 
League’s internationalism with the British people’s history of humanitarianism and 
internationalist labor activism, these imperialists sought to re-envision the imperial 
mission on more fortified and civilized terms.  
Chapter Four discusses the legitimacy of Britain’s liberal imperialism. It 
shows how the ideas of civilization and humanitarianism presented in the League of 
Nation’s Covenant were reinterpreted by Right-wing and Liberal imperialists to 
refortify the dissolving imperial unity. At the same time that the need for imperial 
unity was most urgent, British officials were faced with mounting labor unrest due o 
widespread unemployment and nationalist uprisings throughout the empire. The 
League’s emphasis on cultivating local patriotisms helped establish new domestic and 
imperial education campaigns that re-envisioned British imperial history as one of 
mutual dependence and cooperation. Imperialists took the Covenant’s idea of limited, 
but gradated governance to revitalize the British people’s sense of responsibility to 
the wider empire, but now on more equitable terms. Ultimately, it helped imperialists 
correct an inherent contradiction in prewar liberal imperialist thought. The common 
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interest in the League provided the missing psychosocial component needed to further 
the gradual political evolution towards colonial “self-determination” implied in the 
British constitution. At the same time, this more equitable vision of the empire help d 
strengthen new imperial bonds between the British people and the empire based on 
subjecthood and economic cooperation.    
Lastly, Chapter Five proposes a reevaluation of the League’s role in the 
contested space of British imperial culture between the wars. Historians of the 
League’s place in imperial politics have neglected the many intellectual and cultural 
elements of nineteenth century liberal imperialism that re-emerged after the First 
World War. From the idea of “trusteeship” and civilization to liberal internatio l sm, 
all these themes were embodied by the League of Nations. In fact, the idea of th  
League of Nations and the whole culture that it energized, gave imperialists the 
ability to align more closely the empire’s new international obligations with enduring 
imperial continuities. 
 At the same time, this whole culture based around the principles of the 
League of Nations provided solutions to changes within the empire itself. 1926 serves 
as the end of this thesis because it was essentially the highpoint for the invention of 
imperial unity. Throughout the early 1920s, the imperial market increasingly became 
a vital source of revenue and products for the struggling British people. For British 
officials, it was necessary to cultivate a more equitable and enduring “spiritual unity” 
between the people and the empire because it was only a matter of time before an 
Imperial Conference would grant the Dominions the rights for full political and legal
autonomy. The Balfour Declaration (1926) delivered at the 1926 Imperial 
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Conference, formally articulated the status of the Dominions to Britain that would, by 








In a far-flung empire like that of Britain there must often be clashes of 
interests...In the little league of nations called the Empire, there will be  
many disturbances and many antagonisms. But there is going to be no  
break-unless British statecraft has lost its prescience.  
—Sir John Foster Fraser (1921)24 
 
 
In order to understand how the British Empire was re-envisioned after the 
First World War, it is necessary to briefly sketch out the character of Britain’s 
imperial relations before the war.25 Ever since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, humanitarians regarded social reform as part of a moral duty. This duty was 
based on a cultural standard intractably linked to an innate belief in British 
superiority. Yet events from the 1860’s through the outbreak of the First World War 
demonstrated how this earlier mission failed. At home, science, social theories, and 
competing interests further entrenched this conception of British racial superiority 
just as colonial rebellions and uprisings began to show how the humanitarian mission 
was doomed to fail by its very design. Yet the First World War and the principles 
enshrined by the League of Nations idea challenged all the basic social, intellectual, 
and cultural assumptions inherent in the prewar imperial mission.  
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 Early trusteeship and the moral right of the British 
Throughout the late eighteenth century, British officials described the 
empire’s political and economic rule over its territories such as India as a “sacred 
trust.”26 Drawing from the enlightenment traditions of John Locke and Edmund 
Burke, these officials saw all forms of political and economic dominion as 
providential.27 This idea of trusteeship was used to rationalize imperial expansion and 
Britain’s moral claim to it.    
The idea of trusteeship reflected the gradual and evolutionary nature of 
sovereignty that had been the basis for the British constitution because it relegated the 
degree of authority that was bestowed on its colonies. The British constitution, 
loosely defined, is the organic and unwritten set of “institutions, procedures, rules, 
and conventions” that define the authority of the government.28 As early as the late 
eighteenth century officials progressively allowed more metropolitan oversight, but 
the relationship between Britain and its colonies still generally remained u qual. It 
was not until 1839, under the suggestion of Lord Durham, that Canada was given a 
measure of “responsible government” to appease growing dissatisfaction in the 
colonies of British North America.29 Even so, it was this idea of the gradual evolution 
of the settlement colonies that forms the basis for this idea of the British Empire 
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being a liberal (in a political sense) empire, or an empire that based its rule on a social 
contract.30  
Unlike many British officials, however, evangelical missionary societies in 
Britain during the latter half of the eighteenth century took this idea of imperial 
trusteeship and extended it to include social reform. As Kevin Grant notes, “after the 
late eighteenth century, evangelicals created a global religious movement through 
abolitionist organizations and overseas missionary societies that regarded the social 
reform of foreign peoples as a moral imperative.”31 When Britishers encountered 
colonial peoples during travels or in stories, they often attempted to categorize the 
people they encountered based on race (skin color) and perceived level of social 
progress.32 From the late 1780s to the 1860s, the anti-slavery and missionary 
movements were motivated by a dominant discourse of assimilation. This discourse 
rested on a dominant thought that the most advanced practices and most civilized 
values were to be found in and perfected by the people of the British nation.33    
By the mid-nineteenth century, these humanitarian and missionary societies 
were well established throughout the empire and they had become accepted as part of 
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respectable society in Britain.34 In fact, this commitment to humanitarianism and 
missionary work had a place in domestic reforms and popular culture. Even as this 
discourse of trusteeship fell into disuse in political circles, the idea of a trust s ill 
resonated with the philanthropic circles and reformers at home. Reformers such as 
Samuel Smiles, author of the highly popular book Self-Help (1859), quoted with 
approval the words of the early nineteenth century clergyman and economist Thomas 
Chamers who observed an “implicit trust” in commercial relations.35 Moreover, by 
the 1860s, in missionary circles lecturing in Britain, this moral right and duty also 
became much more overtly linked to inherent characteristics observed in the Anglo-
Saxon race.36   
Imperial expansion and humanitarianism  
By the late-nineteenth century, imperialists revived the term “trusteeship” to 
legitimize the empire’s expanded administrative control over territories as part of 
what was to be described as the “New Imperialism.” Kevin Grant observes that, 
“British officials wanted to represent the expansion of industrial capitalism as a 
means to promote the moral and material improvement of savages who labored for 
the capitalist’s profits.”37 Even the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) which on the 
surface regulated European colonization and trade in Africa, furthered Britain’s 
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dominance in the market by promoting free trade and the empire’s moral claim to its 
“civilizing mission.”38 
With this growing empire, came increasing concerns about international 
security. Although the general practice originated well before the ninetee th century, 
it was during the latter half of the nineteenth century that Britain’s diplomatic policies 
focused on maintaining a balance of power in Europe. Instead of establishing formal 
alliances, this political concept allowed Britain to maintain equilibrium betwe n 
European states powers and thus averting war and leveraging its aspirations for 
imperial, economic, and naval expansion.39 Reinforced by the Council of Vienna 
(1815), this system helped establish a relatively long period of peace in Europe and 
imperial expansion that lasted until the late nineteenth century. This isolation lasted
until the late nineteenth century, when colonial disputes with France in the last 
quarter of the century compromised Britain’s isolation from continental affairs.  
While humanitarian interests did not cease, imperialists and missionaries wee 
becoming increasingly challenged by rebellions and instability in the formal and 
informal empire.40 There were uprisings in India (1857-1858), rebellions in Jamaica 
(1865), and an increase in agitation for Home Rule in Ireland (1880s). Moreover, 
there was also increasing unrest in its African territories such as South Africa (1880s) 
and the Sudan (1896). Even in the most settled territories of Canada and Australia, 
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which by the mid-nineteenth century had been granted more state autonomy, there 
were more assertions for greater independence. In the end, late-nineteenth century 
imperial strategies became what Karuna Mantena describes as “practical responses to 
and accommodations to the nature of ‘native society.”41 Indeed, the criteria for self-
government had increasingly become focused on the idea of nationality and the 
capacity for colonial peoples to unite as opposed to devolve into anarchy or local 
divisions.42 
Social Imperialism and the creation of a national imperialism 
Part of the larger logic of this “New Imperialism” was the influence of the 
social theories that were becoming commonly used to understand relations between 
states and the social progress of the people within them. It became common among 
social theorists to apply racially charged social Darwinian theories to understand the 
functioning and formation of nation-states. Social theorists such as Benjamin Kidd 
and Karl Pearson feverishly worked to understand how societies evolved and what 
kind of social and political structures were needed for people to progress.43 Yet, just 
as the doctrine of “survival of the fittest” informed rationales for imperial xpansion, 
it also raised questions about the state of the British Empire and the racial and 
physical well-being of the people at home.      
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The Boer War (1889-1902), served as the final straw for many liberal 
imperialists trying to manage the tenuous relationships that the British Empire had 
with its territories and the increasing social decline at home. Throughout the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, social investigators and reformers had begun to take 
note of the squalid conditions of the urban poor. These fears escalated to national 
panic as this war exposed what these humanitarians saw as the poor physical and 
moral health of the British people and the general inefficient management of the 
empire and its military.     
The strength of the empire was determined by improving Britain’s economic 
conditions and by improving the material and social conditions of the people within 
the empire. Social imperialism became the term to describe what scholars desc ibe as 
Britain’s aggressive social programs and imperial policy-making that were 
simultaneously implemented at the turn of the twentieth century to remedy these 
deficiencies. In the language of imperial defense and nationalism, this multifaceted 
ideology incorporated reforms and policies focused on eugenics, nutrition and 
educational programs aimed at reversing physical deterioration, and promoting 
compulsory military service.44  
The idea of trying to draw all classes of the nation together in defense of an 
empire was, for some intellectuals, the solution to an empire that had lost efficiency 
and was threatened by increasing economic and imperial competition. As John 
MacKenzie notes that the, “empire had not only become bound up with social reform, 
but had developed some of the vision of economic idealism which was to come front 
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of propaganda stage after the First World War.”45 Imperial unity and the cultivation 
of an imperial race served as the ideological force behind government sponsored 
social policies and various scouting, service, and humanitarian leagues. These popular 
organizations and social services were formed in part to improve the physical health 
of the British people so they could meet their imperial obligations and serve as 
sources of education about their duty to the empire in their everyday work.   
For social theorists such as Benjamin Kidd and Karl Pearson, the laiss z faire 
attitude of the British Liberal state was inefficient because it stifled the innate 
evolution of social progress of the working class.46 For these social theorists, the 
nation was less politically competitive and strong because there was an internal 
struggle between the unrestrained interests of the working class and those above 
them. “National Efficiency” became a term to describe the policy-making intending 
to make the business of war more efficient in industrial as well as human terms. It 
was a policy devised to streamline government programs and provide social reforms 
to strengthen the population needed for imperial defense. In fact, according to R. J.
Scally, the wartime and postwar nationalization projects that Lloyd George’s 
Coalition government (1916-1922) attempted to implement brought together social 
imperialism’s diverse threads of tariff reform, popular liberal imperialism, and Fabian 
corporatist thought.47   
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Imperialists enshrined social reforms in an imperial rhetoric so that the 
working class could be led to believe that their interests and that of the state were one 
and the same. Yet, reflecting back to his experiences in a dining club devoted to 
solving the inefficient state of the empire, H. G. Wells described what his 
contemporaries neglected. He noted in his autobiography that, “they were all for 
training and armaments and defensive alliances, and they were all careless o  
contemptuous of that breadth and vigour of education in which the true greatness of a 
people lies.”48    
The First World War and the intellectual challenge to empire 
The First World War disrupted many of the rationales for the continued 
imperial presence in the affairs of its Dominions and colonies. Rather than highlig t 
the rigid hierarchies of civilization that not only informed prewar diplomatic 
relations, but imperial relations, wartime propaganda in Britain attempted to unite all 
the people in the empire under a common imperial culture and subjecthood. This 
subjecthood referred to a set of practices and ways of behaving that could be 
conditioned and learned, rather than viewing people solely in terms of inherited racial 
traits. As Keith McClelland and Sonya O. Rose illustrate, “the official term for British 
national was British Subject, and British subjecthood was based on the principle of 
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jus soli (born in a territory under the British Crown). British subjecthood, then, was 
an imperial form of belonging as well as a form of ‘nationality.’”49  
By emphasizing the conception of subjecthood rather than brute military 
strength, British imperialists tried to transcended ethnic, racial, and national lines so 
that all could identify with fighting for a common cause.50 This less divisive and more 
inclusive conception of civilization sought to obtain and maintain the support of the 
people of its dependents who were not only needed for military support, but could 
have just as easily seen the war as a moment for revolt.51 Wartime imperialism 
became conflated with nationalism as the practices and principles of sovereignty 
became ever the more associated with “civilization.” As Peter Mandler notes, “The 
ideals summoned up by wartime propaganda were those now familiar ideals of 
‘civilization’ with which not specifically England but more generally Britain, the 
British Empire and ideally the whole of humanity were associated.”52   
One of the more visceral wartime rallying points in British propaganda that 
helped shaped postwar policy-making was for the wider imperial fight in defense of 
civilization. During the war, as well as in the years immediately after, imperialists 
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worked through all popular and political channels to distinguish the British Empire 
from German imperial culture. Entente and American propaganda efforts exploitd 
Germany’s rationale for its defense of its own universal national ideal based on 
Kultur, as socially and culturally arrogant, militaristic and oppressively 
imperialistic.53 Conversely, the British and Entente propaganda translated the wartime 
objectives as protecting democracy and peace.54   
The war also voided the biological assumptions and empirical observations 
about race, social progress, and national superiority in respect to groups outside the 
empire as well as within. It was widely observed that the war had proved that 
associating race with skin color and values of superiority or inferiority was invalid. 
Intellectuals such as Alfred Zimmern reminded his listeners in 1925 of Turkey’s 
tenacity during the Gallipoli Campaign (1915-1916) and even Japan’s respected 
technical sophistication in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, which shattered widespread 
assumptions about national superiority based on biological and racial categories.55 In 
fact, these observations proved to imperialists that other “races” were just as efficient 
and as capable of political and psychosocial progress as the once esteemed Anglo –
Saxon race. 
The wartime experience validated the increasingly popular investigation of 
psychosocial and cultural instincts social psychologists thought individuals shared 
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with a community before the war.56 Social psychology became a popular way to 
understand the underlying causes of the war and how to prevent it. For example, 
Wilfred Trotter, a British surgeon and social psychologist theorized about the origins 
of a “herd instinct” in humans that often caused war but could also be a key to peace. 
He argued that a gregarious instinct in human beings was influenced by the stimuli of 
war and nationalism. “When war breaks upon a society thus constituted the intense 
stimulation of herd instinct that results tend to break down the moral restrictions set 
up by segregation, to throw back the individual citizen on to the nation at large for the 
satisfaction of his moral needs, and to replace class feeling by national feeling.”57 
Social psychologists tried to isolate the intrinsic human commonalities that naurally 
formed strong bond. These psychologists focused on containing these social 
“instincts” and shaping them. Social psychology divorced race from its earlier 
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biological determinism as it became part of a host of variables that interacted with a 
mind and that was driven by universal social impulses.  
According to social psychologists like Trotter, individuals did not have a 
comprehensive view of their world beyond their own self-interest when these 
instincts were unchecked by the intellect or environmental restraint. He argu d that 
“This limitation has effectually prevented man from defining his situation in the 
world, and he remains a captive in the house of circumstance, restrained as effectually 
by the mere painted canvas of habit, convention and fear as by the solid masonry of 
essential instinctive needs.”58 He linked the militaristic nationalism and imperialism 
with the underlying motivations for social reform before the war. He thought that the 
“herd instinct” gravitated individuals to groups that satiated diverse instinctual needs 
at the expense of allowing individuals to “defining his situation in the world” and thus 
failing to have the qualities possible to participate fully in it in a civilized manner.  
On a fundamental level, the wartime experience also compromised all the 
elitist and rigidly empirical categories of superiority and civilized behavior that had 
once fortified the place of the British people over its colonies. By 1916, colonial 
leaders were incorporated into the management of the War Cabinet when it became 
clear that Dominion and colonial support was vital to the war effort. This posed a 
problem for British officials who realized that there was a greater need for the 
imperial cooperation for postwar reconstruction at home, but who also had to manage 
the growing nationalist sentiment erupting in every sector of the empire. At the end of 
the war, the colonies and Dominions strongly argued for their due compensation for 
their contribution to the war. This compensation came in a variety of forms such as 
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Home Rule, more independence in foreign policy-making, and the acquisition of 
states from the redistribution of the defeated empires’ territories.  
The League of Nations and the problem of empire 
The cultural and intellectual approach to understanding imperial culture in 
Britain is particularly useful because the postwar debates about the importance of the 
empire were elaborated in a similar discursive space—that is, within the terms of a 
civic vision of the empire. Before the war, the ultimate purpose of imperial 
propaganda and the idea of imperial unity was to downplay the material and social 
inequalities that many elites thought threatened not only the British nation’s fortitude 
but that of the empire itself. Yet after the war, notions of the legitimacy of the empire 
differed radically from that explored by the aforementioned social and cultural 
historians of prewar imperialism. Imperialists had to envision the empire in a way that 
was compatible with a new culture of internationalism embodied by the League of 
Nations and all the new social theories that it drew from. Imperialists were now 
forced to envision a new partnership between Britain and the rest of the empire that 
could be compatible with the now validated social psychology and the proscriptions 
laid out in the League of Nation’s Article 22.   
The attempts made by representatives of the League of Nation’s member 
states to reclassify the borders of mandated states furthered a crisis in the legitimacy 
of the empire at home and abroad. From the beginning, the League of Nations idea 
intended to offset the hierarchical power dynamics that many politicians thought 
caused war. Basing its strength on the will of public opinion rather than the might of a 
military, the League of Nations supporters invoked a social psychological 
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understanding of human nature to organize the gradated mandated system.59 Instead 
of organizing the new world order by “race” in its biological sense, it focused on the 
capacity for a territory’s people to organize into a coherent nation and express a 
unified and coherent nationalism that could withstand the pressures of dominating 
forces.     
Not only was the Versailles Peace Conference where diplomats sketched out 
the peace terms and the League’s machinery formed, but it was where politicians 
debated on the idea of “self-determination” and what it was to actually mean in 
practice after the war. It was essentially the point of intersection between the 
changing perceptions of not only what it actually meant to be civilized enough for 
self-determination in the world, but in the empire itself.  
It is not being suggested that a hierarchy did not still exist in the League or 
within the empire, but this hierarchy was now based on a certain body of behaviors 
and attitudes about the social that could be learned and reasonably obtained. In the 
principles that framed the logic for the mandates, the writers of the Covenant 
juxtapose the “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world” with the modern (implied) nation-state’s 
responsibility to form a “sacred trust of civilisation.”60 While this language is 
reminiscent of the tradition of trusteeship of nineteenth century imperial 
humanitarianism, the covenant limited and required “securities for the performance of 
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this trust.”61 In contrast to what contemporaries had observed as the dysfunctional and 
inefficient colonial system, the Covenant of the League established legal prcepts 
intending to foster economic and sociocultural modernization of mandated 
territories.62  
Many League supporters like R. J. Muir had taken hold of the idea that the 
conflation of race with the nation had been the cause of the war. The war had been 
based on an artificial “superiority” complex that had developed not only on the basis 
of the color of one’s skin, but one’s place of origin. He argued that “it is indeed 
highly important that the two ideas of the race and the nation should be kept distinct; 
for undue emphasis upon the racial element in nationality has produced many 
unhappy results. “Racialism” (that is, the belief in the inherent superiority of one race 
over another, and in the fundamental antipathy between races) much more than 
“nationalism” has been the enemy of peace, and those who speak of the national spirit 
as the source of war are generally thinking of the racial rather than the national 
idea.”63 
The League of Nations’ new principles sought to contain the uncivilized 
impulses that the war had exposed in all people and not just one particular group or 
race. In a published transcript of an address delivered to the International Federtion 
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of League of Nations Societies, Norman Angell explained to his audience the 
collective responsibility that all people had to have in order to secure international 
peace. In this, he invoked the “herd instinct” when speaking about humanity’s 
irrationality and instinct for war. “We have all been condemned to win our salvation, 
if at all, by the sweat of our brow, which I take to mean the sweat of the brain behind 
it, and by subduing, directing and civilising the passions of our human nature.”64 
Rather than depend on a Victorian idealism that put faith in a coherent hierarchy and 
bureaucracy to contain disorder, there was a conscious attempt to rationally plan for 
and mitigate the “passions” and unknowns of human nature.65 
All the basic assumptions about imperial rule were challenged by the 
League’s existence. While the responsibility for “protecting” weaker natio s had 
historically been occupied by Britain’s liberal imperial mission, the exist nce of the 
League made it more difficult to sustain. In an editorial to The Times, Robert Cecil 
criticized the Prime Minister Lloyd George who, at a debate at the House of 
Parliament, argued that the Supreme Council and not the League of Nations should be 
entrusted with choosing the mandated powers for the various territories. 66 Cecil 
thought that the mandate system should not operate in a manner that privileged the 
interests of the British Empire. He thought that “unless the mandates effectively 
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entitle the natives to protection and forbid improper employment of the resources of 
the mandated territory, the supervisory powers of the league will be a farce, and we 
shall be back in the bad old days of conquest and exploitation which it was the chief 
object of the mandatory system to destroy.”67 The mandate system served to protect 
weaker states from the power of belligerents. Rather than ascribing imperial claim to 
the mandated countries, Cecil legitimized authority over other nations against the 
“conquest and exploitation” of imperialism itself. While obviously not referring to 
Britain’s own imperial history, but Germany’s, Cecil’s rhetoric still suggested a 
linguistic turn away from former notions of empire. Trusteeship was no longer about 
cultural assimilation. Instead, it required a transnational body like the League to 
oversee, manage, and protect the territories from the socioeconomic concerns that 
were common to all people.   
The public debate about the League of Nations required Britain to reevaluate 
the very qualities and prejudices that British officials used to determine a territory’s 
capacity to self-govern. In regards to the “Eastern Question,” writers such as A.J. 
Toynbee voiced a contrary perception of the intractable link between race and 
civilization as a way to destabilize public perceptions of what it meant to be civilized 
after the war. Writing about the political and cultural clash that had been long posited 
between Western and Eastern civilizations, Toynbee challenged his readers to “get rid 
of the notion that the East is unchanging” which while “prevalent in the West, is 
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based on insufficient data and is very misleading.”68 Toynbee’s insistence that the 
underlying assumptions that served as the basis of the strident divisions of Western 
and Eastern civilizations and were the cause of previous and past conflicts neglected 
the fact that “civilization is in itself a bond between all peoples that posses it, 
however different the types of their civilization may be.”69 In fact, it was the clash 
with or the negation of the other civilization that caused conflict.   
While writing about the Pan-Islamic movement, Toynbee argued that the 
movement was actually a natural defense against Western expansionism and its 
attempt to assimilate the “Eastern people” and not an aggressive and intolerant 
movement. He noted that “Pan-Islamism, in fact, is a case of the herd instinct which 
makes animals and human beings crowd together for mutual protection in face of a 
common danger and which also makes individual members of the herd sacrifice 
themselves that the herd may survive[sic].” 70 The idea of civilization was no longer 
based on a hierarchy of intrinsic racial categories. Instead, it was based on a set of 
practices and organizing features of a society that while different in type, were based 
on an ingrained “herd instinct” that had been developed over time.  
The outcry for more equal footing and cooperation would not be lost to 
members of the Dominions either. As the Bishop from North Queensland observed,   
“in days like these, when crowns and laws are in the melting pot, it is dangerous to 
overlook the fact that, loyal as the Dominions are to the Crown, their allegiance 
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cannot be forced by a legal process. It is based upon good will.”71 First, the 
Dominion’s support during the war reflected the possibility for these nations to obtain 
the qualities necessary for the right of self-rule. Second, their particiption 
demonstrated to imperialists the “success” of the empire’s years of unyieldi g 
imperial rule. Before the war, the imperial type of citizenship was large y and 
unforgivingly unequal, but after the war that changed; Dominions asserted greater 
independence from imperial affairs in the running of their states. The British people 
and the British government in particular, had to change their attitude about their 
relationship with the rest of the empire. Rather than the colonies ultimately having to 
acquiesce to the will of Whitehall, imperial cooperation increasingly had to be based 
on the “good will” and “allegiances” from the colonies.  
This unraveling of racial stereotypes posed an additional problem for British 
officials who based prewar imperial culture on a chauvinistic categorizing and racial 
“othering” of not only its imperial rivals but of its colonial dependents.72 In a League 
of Nations Union pamphlet titled “The Word and the League,” Gilbert Murray 
pointed out the paradox of commonly held notions of civilization. He wrote that, “if 
you want peaceful races, I cannot recommend you any better place to go than my ow
native country, to study the Australian aborigines. They never make war at all. The 
strange fact seems to be that on the whole the races that have come to the top in 
civilisation, that have made the greatest contributions to the nobler life of mankind, 
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72 This is not to say that each dependent was treated equally. At the turn of the twentieth century, the
white dominions enjoyed greater independence from Britain in terms of sovereignty. On the other 
hand, India and the non-white dependencies were allowed greater self-government on the basis of an 
inconsistent standard regarding their ability to assimilate into British culture.   
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are the pugnacious races.”73 The wartime contribution of men and women from 
around the empire demonstrated that the most civilized behaviors such as loyalty and 
duty could be found similarly in the actions of dependents who were often presented 
as unfit for self-rule. Conversely, the most uncivilized behaviors could be found in 
the most civilized of peoples.   
How the League of Nations was handling the partitioning of the Middle East 
brought to light the very same questions that critics had about the management of the 
British Empire after the war. A correspondent from The Times recalled the increasing 
resistance in India over its administration by the British and how it should cast doubt 
on the proposed European control and “modernization” of Mesopotamia. He observed 
that “we are asking the Arab to exchange his pride and independence for a little 
Western civilization and a certain amount of commercial development, the profitsof 
which must be largely absorbed by the expenses of administration. From his point of 
view it is a poor bargain; we have still to consider what sort of venture it is from 
ours.”74 All the hallmarks of Western progress such as commercial development and 
a strong, more apparent, and “efficient” administration were not, in this writer’s 
opinion, priorities for the Arab. His article suggested that the Ottoman Empire’s 
traditional political system may have actually allowed for better imperial management 
because it was run in a manner that was better capable of settling disputes and 
differences among groups of different faiths and backgrounds.75  
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In fact, the writer was not only questioning the viability of established 
political and economic assumptions in Britain, but the very imperial culture that those
political and economic paradigms created. Implicitly, he questioned the legitimacy of 
a whole culture in Britain that had been created around a cult of political and 
economic efficiency that used material progress as a mark of civilized progress at 
home and abroad. The British public’s widespread unwillingness to repeat the prewar
arms race further fueled popular opposition to the “National Efficiency” policies that 
focused on building up Britain’s military forces.76 Yet, to political leaders, the 
imperial unity was even more important to the domestic population for security and 
postwar reconstruction even though many of the facets of the prewar imperial was f r 
from palatable to a war-weary public. Already at an imbalance before the war, 
domestic British industries after the war shifted away from consumer goods t wards 
raw materials to support the war effort. In terms of the economy, the disruption of 
prewar industry and trade routes increased the dependency on the empire. By the end 
of the First World War, Britain stopped producing for its main foreign markets as 
well.77 Overseas trade slumped by late 1920, so the empire market—even with new 
tariffs being erected within the system—was seen as the best opportunity for 
commerce.78   
Moreover, social psychology had demonstrated to postwar imperialists that 
psychological traits left over from prior social relations could not be ignored. In a 
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League of Nations Union pamphlet paper, a prominent educationist J.C. Maxwell 
Garnett described how the League of Nations rested on an active internationalist 
sensibility of an informed public opinion. Drawing from the works of social 
psychologists such as the Englishman William McDougall and the American, W.B. 
Pillsbury, Garnett described how patriotism was a “self-regarding sentim t” of being 
part of a larger group to which one made a sacrifice.79 Writing about the “patriotic” 
statesman’s responsibility to think about the effect of his decisions at the League 
Assembly on the world, Garnett wrote that “[t]he statesmen can only do it if the 
public opinions of their countries understand and approve. Men’s minds, we repeat, 
must be changed…Patriotism must cease to be the differentiator and become the 
integrator of nations.”80 Patriotism required an active and knowledgeable public 
opinion committed to international concerns for the purpose of national well-being 
instead of being a sentiment that divided people.  
It is here, at the end of the war, where the main themes of British imperial 
culture and the culture of the League of Nations come together to present British
officials with an imperial crisis. British intellectuals and politicians u iversally 
understood that the empire was vital to postwar international security and 
reconstruction efforts in Britain. Yet, the war and all the social theories and ideas 
related to the League of Nations invalidate the basic premises of a prewar imperial 
culture based on a bold imperial militarism and isolationism. Culturally and socially, 
                                                
79 Maxwell Garnett, Patriotism, League of Nations Union Pamphlet Series 197 (London: League of 
Nations Union, 1926), 14. See also: “The Psychology f Patriotism. Changed World Conditions.” The 
Times. August 6, 1926; 6.  Maxwell Garnett “The Psychology f Patriotism,” delivered at Section J 
(Psychology) of the British Association for the Advancement of Science on August 6, 1926.     
 
80 Ibid., 23. 
 
 40
the idea of imperialism had become unpopular even though politically, critics thought 
that Wilson’s bold principle of self-determination was still limited by an imperial 
collusion at the Versailles conference. After the war, British officials were not only 
faced with the difficult task of establishing the terms for a completely new vision of 
imperial relations with its colonies and Dominions, but within the hearts and minds of 
the British public. 
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Chapter 3:  The Empire and the Cultivation of an 
“International Mind” 
 
Until the old herd instinct of nationalism can be, if not merged in, at 
least made perfectly compatible with, the wider form of herd instinct 
which embraces all mankind, it will be impossible to form a league of  
nations which has the living reality of the people's will behind it.  




Any imperial fervor that swept British culture before the war certainly did not 
continue to hold the same appeal after it.82 Culturally, the prewar chauvinistic 
militarism of the imperial voluntary associations and propaganda lost respectability 
among its consumers. With this demise of a robust cultural rationalization for 
imperial rule, there also came a much more democratic and politically agitated polity. 
The war also ushered in an economic malaise that fueled a more vocal and stronger 
militancy among the greatly increased members of trade unionist movement.83 In 
light of facing new social and economic challenges after the war, imperialists had to 
devise new strategies to make the empire not only relevant to the material wellbeing 
of the British nation, but its psychological wellbeing. The British people had to 
develop a new psychology based on its long history of internationalism and the care 
of common human interests. The League of Nation’s internationalism was linked to 
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the British people’s deeply engrained cultural history of internationalism and human 
cooperation. These distinctive qualities demonstrated the British people’s innate 
ability and mandate to pursue international peace and social reform as active patriotic 
representatives of the British Empire.         
In the eyes of many imperialists, the key to solving the political and economic 
dangers of the postwar empire lay in the management of the British people’s deep-
seated internationalism. It was common for social imperialists at the turn of the 
century to try to undermine the Cobdenite or Liberal-socialist’s tradition of working 
class’ internationalism which stood in opposition to the strategies for national unity.84 
Traditionally, the term internationalism was used in the decades before the war to 
describe a variety of proposed alternatives to the tenuous “balance of power” upheld 
by the competing nationalist rivalries in Europe.85 The most organized and ubiquitous 
critique of this system referred to groups affiliated with the Internatio l Working 
Men’s Association (also known as the First International).86 The early British Labour 
movement—as an associational member of the First International—embraced 
internationalism as a unifying idea to usurp the rampant nationalism, capitalism, nd 
imperialism that typified Europe’s deteriorating balance of power.   
Yet when the opportunity came for the First International’s body to show its 
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solidarity during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), and again for the Second 
International—a reformed regrouping of its predecessor—in the wake of the First 
World War, their internationalism could not compete with the fervor of nationalism.87 
By the end of the war, international cooperation—a central tenet of the League of 
Nations—became not only a given in British politics, but a means to unite the nation 
in a time where blind nationalist patriotism was under intense scrutiny by many 
international leaders. In fact, the internationalism that had once been stifled was now 
seen as an established collective spirit that could be exploited and merged with the 
internationalist political commitments British foreign policy had to now develop.  
After the First World War, the term internationalism and the whole 
conceptual vocabulary that it embodied changed. If internationalism traditionally 
meant the spirit of working class solidarity commonly shared by the British Labour 
party and other trade unions through the First and Second International, even the 
Labour party now began to use the term to refer to a more universal imperial 
solidarity embodied by the League of Nations. Working through organizations such 
as the League of Nations Union, imperialists from all ends of the political spectrum in 
Britain used the new conception of internationalism to cultivate a more enduring 
imperial patriotism and unity that was fueled by each and every individual’s 
“international mind.” 
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The critique of British imperial policy after WWI 
The empire was necessary to domestic reconstruction even though the elitist 
and exploitative culture of patriotism could no longer form the basis of the cultural 
and economic relationships that the British people had with it. Internationalism, as 
understood by League supporters, became part of the political language used to 
redefine domestic politics regarding the empire in Britain. As Conservatives and 
Liberal Coalitionist leaders such as Lloyd George struggled to negotiate the extent 
that Britain could embrace the League’s internationalism without compromising 
imperial sovereignty, left-wing radicals and Labour leaders challenged the very 
meaning that internationalism held in Britain after the war.  
Nearly a year before the world powers convened in Versailles in June 1919 to 
define a new international order, the British Labour party had ratified on January 23, 
1918, their own plans for a new social order. The party’s new constitution outlined 
the party’s organization and broad political program in the postwar world. It noted the 
party’s commitment to “co-operate with the Labour organizations in other countries, 
and to assist in organising a Federation of Nations for the maintenance of Freedom 
and Peace, for the establishment of suitable machinery for the adjustment and 
settlement of International Disputes by Conciliation or Judicial Arbitration, and for 
such International Legislation as may be practicable.”88 The League of Nations 
formed the basis for a new political language in Britain that could redefine 
international and imperial relations.    
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The political Left’s fears that Britain’s traditional imperialist foreign policy 
interests would continue to dominate the outcome of the Peace Treaty proceedings 
were confirmed the day the official summary was released. After the League released 
the summary of the peace terms in May 1919, the Labour Party Executive Committee 
quickly responded with a manifesto criticizing the reparation clauses that were 
ratified during the Peace conference. The manifesto noted that the League in its 
current form “bears evidence of compromise influenced by capitalist imperialism that 
still dominates the European States.”89 The Labour party contended that the 
conference was corrupted by the same imperialist interests that were thought to have 
caused the war. 
The Left was not anti-empire as much as it was anti-imperialist. For the Left, 
the traditional imperial policies prevented the humanitarian and reform initiatives 
from bringing dependent territories out from their history of economic and social 
exploitation by the British Empire. In a Labour Party Pamphlet titled “The Empire in 
Africa: Labour’s Policy,” the writer outlined how the British Empire’s system of rule 
had to change.           
We have seen that Labour principles require that the British system of 
administration shall be altered and shall aim at conditions in which the native 
will take his place as a free man in the economic system, reaping for himself 
and his community the riches of his own country, and will also take his place 
as a free citizen controlling his own government.  Both these results depend 
ultimately on education….90 
  
The Left wanted the British Empire’s administrative system to change, not be 
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eliminated all together. They wanted to “alter” the established liberal imperial 
administration because it failed to provide the African people with the education and 
economic base necessary for self-sufficiency in the modern world.91   
Through the League of Nations, the Left wanted to reestablish the British 
Empire’s responsibilities to the African people with a policy based on the “civilizing 
mission” that the late-nineteenth century Empire failed to pursue.   
Under Article 22 the mandate system is, of course, only applied to the late 
German colonies.  But it is applied because the Peace Conference adopted a 
principle which has already been put forward by Labour, namely, that the 
“well-being and development of” the peoples of African territories is “a 
sacred trust of civlisation,” and that the European State administrating the 
territories must be considered only a trustee or mandatory answerable for its 
trusts to the rest of the civilized world.”92   
 
The failure of the League of Nations was not that it reflected imperialism, but that it 
did not extend itself far enough to provide the rest of the British Empire the economic 
and social safeguards promised by the “sacred trust.” The Labour Party saw iself as 
the original advocate for the League’s new sacred trust and thus the proper party to
orchestrate its full potential as the majority government.     
Unlike many right-wing Liberals and Conservatives who conceived of 
existing imperial machineries of government as models for the League of Nati ns nd 
its policies, Labour leaders found these existing systems of government limiting and 
contradictory to the ideals of a league of nations. For Labour, the League’s failure to 
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provide the widespread and effective diplomatic reforms necessary to ensure peace 
and just arbitration was caused by the collusion of ineffective empires deploying 
foreign policies. Britain’s foreign policies were limited by the imperialist and 
capitalist ideologies that dominated the discourse and procedures at the Home Office. 
In a distributed pamphlet, the Labour party drew out that argument over the 
limitations of conservative foreign policy. It argued that, “[f]oreign affairs, or the 
relations of this country and people with other countries and peoples, are still 
jealously guarded as the province or monopoly of a small class, clique, or caste…The 
actions of those who are actually responsible for the control of policy or of the agents 
are not subject to control either by the electorate or by Parliament.”93 The Labour 
party argued that contemporary foreign affairs were controlled by smallbut powerful 
interest groups and classes rather than the people or legislatures. For critics, the 
structure of government and conduct of foreign relations were based on a system that 
prevented democratic control over foreign policy. 
In fact, the problem that many after the war thought plagued the British people 
was a social psychology fueled by individual, class, or national interests rather than 
common human interests. In a book that would serve as influential to the creation of 
the League of Nations titled International Government, Leonard Woolf foreshadowed 
the problems faced by an international organization such as the League of Nations
without it being supported by a proper internationalist psychology: 
Man in national or international masses is not yet an orderly or reasonable 
animal. He is an animal of passion and prejudice. Any system, or 
organization, or machinery for governing his affairs must, if it is to be 
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accepted by him, allow play to these passions and prejudices. It is no good 
building him a brand new, beautiful, international institution [….] There 
would be no grounds for deploring the uselessness of human effort if, by a 
judicious process of intellectual and emotional tickling, human beings could 
be induced to divert some of the energies which they devote to the 
construction of armies and armaments to the construction of this feeble and 
faulty system of pacific machinery.94  
 
Britain’s foreign policies and machinery of government allied themselves driven by a 
cultural psychology that maintained national and imperial interests. Leonard Woolf 
asserted that most people still lacked the capacity to think as world citizens, but there 
was a possibility that it could be learned. By a “judicious process of intellectua  and 
emotional tickling” people may be compelled to divert the energies they had devoted 
to war and alliances to international arbitration and peace. 
Labour leaders tried to cultivate a new spirit of internationalism in a world 
whose people, many on the Left thought were conditioned for militant nationalism 
and imperialism. Philip Snowden argued that widespread ignorance perpetuated the 
imperialist policies that manifested themselves in belligerent nationalisms and 
imperial exploitation. He stated in 1921 that “popular support to a policy of 
Imperialism has been given not only because such a policy gratified national pride, 
but through ignorance of the fact that the interests of a nation are not identical with 
the interests of selfish individuals and classes within that nation.”95 Over time, habit 
and intellectual complacency formed a psychology of the nation that tied the political 
with vested imperial policies and capitalist practices.    
 While discussing past “misinterpretations” of patriotism, Harold Laski, an 
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active Labour Party member and supporter of the League of Nations, also argued in 
1925 that the meaning of modern patriotism and nationalism had been usurped by a 
vested few. For Laski, “the emphatically territorial character of the sov reign-nation 
State enables a small section of members to utilize its power for their own ends, even 
against the interests of their fellow citizens. Against such a danger international 
government represents the most solid protection we have.”96 An international 
government intended to broaden the protections of its people, rather than impose 
power on a nation’s citizens.   
Education and the creation of a knowledgeable imperial society   
That did not mean that the Left gave up on the League of Nations or the 
government entirely. Labour leaders in particular had to answer to critics in he labour 
movement who questioned whether a league of governments could address the needs 
of the people. In a Labour party tract titled The Demand of Labour for a League of 
Nations, published by the League of Nations Society, the writer engaged criticisms 
from within the labour movement which argued that the League of Nations was only 
a pact between nations:  
Governments will continue to exist after the war, and international relations 
will be regulated by the Governments of different countries. Thus at Brest 
[sic] M. Trotsky speaks on behalf of Russia no less than Herr Kühlmann on 
behalf of a German Government. If Democrats and Democracies stand aside 
because of their mistrust of Governments, and neglect to establish and 
exercise control over their Governments in foreign affairs, they will be 
repeating the mistake which they made before the war. The International had  
place in the past and will no doubt again have a great place in the future, but it 
cannot take the place of a League of Nations.97  
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Written in February of 1918, the tract argued that the will of the people was not ill-
represented by any one type of government. Rather, a government became corrupt 
when there was not a civic engagement with it. Critics within the labour movement 
“misunderstood” the relationship that the individual has with the nation-state. The 
internationalism familiar to many in the labour movement in the form of the First 
International and Second International was one based on an abstract class solidarity 
that could not be easily translated into political terms.98 Rather than the idea of 
internationalism be understood in a way that was opposed to traditional forms of 
government, it actually could supplement and improve established governmental 
services and missions.   
Public opinion on a local level was essential to the operations of not only a 
truly democratic and representative League of Nations, but for the historical heart of 
the empire itself, Britain. The Labour party’s handbook for speakers illustrated their 
steadfast position arguing that a true league of nations was based not on the will of 
governments but on the will of the people. Its function “should not be so much 
coercive as legislative, operating through popular organs representing the European 
peoples and parties of all opinions, and not merely the Foreign Offices, Cabinets, or 
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Governments.99 The Labour party envisioned the League of Nations as “a popular 
organ,” to reflect the opinions of people within a civilized nation rather than reflect 
the mechanisms of a coercive state.     
Social reform and labour advocacy, both well established priorities in Labour 
politics prior to the war, took upon new and important roles in their promotion of 
more cooperative and democratic participation. They were at the heart of representing 
the will and needs of the British people. As Philip Snowden later observed, “The 
Socialist International from its inception has been trying to do the work which the 
International Labour Department of the League of Nations, and the League of Nations 
itself, were ostensibly created to do.”100 In fact, the Party’s ideological origins were 
formed by the largely European associations of labour organizations formed before 
the war.101 While not officially socialist before the war, the Labour party advocated 
on behalf of the working class and a general opposition to militarism, capitalism, nd 
imperialism. By the end of the war, many members of the British labour movement 
continued to promote the League of Nations and its non-political organization, the 
International Labour Organization. These intended to provide a formal means to 
conduct reconstruction and social reform efforts on an international scale. The 
organizations were needed to help foster environments that could, in the words of a 
Fabian, “secure the well-being, physical, moral, and intellectual of the industrial 
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After the war, the language of the political Left had taken a more universally 
moral, and internationalist character. From the ratification of the new Labour 
Constitution in 1918 onward, Labour party leaders de-emphasized the language of 
class and promoted a universal world citizen. In a pamphlet co-authored by Ramsay 
MacDonald, MacDonald reiterated the ideal relationship between nations. He 
advocated for “Open diplomacy, a League not of Nations nor of Governments, but of 
Peoples—full of knowledge on the part of the nations where they are, what they are 
standing for, what burdens they bear and what responsibilities are theirs.”103 Open 
diplomacy was not based on relationships between states, but from an association 
between peoples. The Labour party stressed a type of international unity that invoked 
a universal and non-politicized solidarity based on the cultivation of an educated, 
civilized, and moral community of people.  
The Labour party’s emphasis on a community of people “full of knowledge” 
cannot be too strongly emphasized. Even with the widespread change in public 
politics with the granting of nearly universal suffrage with the Representation of the
People Act (1918), there were concerns over the sophistication of public opinion.104 
Expressing a general sensibility widely felt after the war, Philip Snowden felt that 
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public opinion had not been instilled with a sensibility amicable to a peaceful society. 
He stated that “it is not believed to be possible to establish and maintain a high degree 
of industrial and social progress with a population intellectually and morally 
undeveloped to use its resources and opportunities in a rational way.”105 Without 
social reform and the cultivation of rational self-restraint and education for a m re 
informed public opinion, peace in domestic or international relations was not 
guaranteed. This education would foster this internationalism and prevent the British 
people from being manipulated and conditioned by former political relations.   
Left-wing supporters of the League argued that the domestic problems were 
not as much about the working class’ tendency toward collective organization, but the 
sensibilities that informed and fueled it. For Norman Angell, it was the sensibility and 
ideas of the vested and powerful few that caused the national and international 
troubles: “Of late, we seem greatly to have feared the “mob” and its revolutions, with 
its confiscations, economic disturbances, social disintegration. But in the last fifteen
years, the most destructive exhibitions of the mob mind—and the most economically 
disturbing, incidentally—have been on the part of the aristocracies, autocracies, 
oligarchies.”106 While many of Angell’s contemporaries were concerned about the 
“mob mentality” of the masses, Angell equally questioned the state of the groups in 
power who had a part in forming and “educating” the masses many feared. In fact, the 
aristocracies, autocracies, and oligarchies were more to blame for the economic, 
social, and diplomatic disintegration than the ill-informed masses.      
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Those attempting to understand the British people’s place in the postwar 
world had to contend with the reality that the shadow of old conceptual forms such as 
imperialism and capitalism and their corresponding codes of relations still remained. 
They were the forces that had conditioned the very minds of everyone involved, even 
though the credibility of both imperialism and capitalism had been compromised by 
the war. Drawing from the popular interest in social psychology, British intellec uals 
and politicians placed a new and important role of the social on  political ideologies. 
They thought that people had become conditioned by ideologies that operated on 
emotion and habit and the purpose of perpetuating itself through mass delusion and 
control. Even though before the war politicians and intellectuals were wary of the 
“mass mind,” postwar suffrage only added to it. “The present ignorance of the 
proletariat on every question of international politics makes it only too easy for those
in control of the country’s foreign policy to deceive and delude the people….”107 
They thought that the malleable nature of the ignorant and complacent mind lent itsef 
to be easily controlled by popular movements and ideologies.  
Humanitarian and anti-war organizations—many of which had their roots 
from before the war—gained new prominence and political influence because of their 
proven record of mobilizing people through networks based on common social 
interests. Popular League of Nations movements vied for the support of the battle 
weary population. The most influential and “troubling” to bureaucrats and elites was 
the League of Nations Union. The League of Nations Union started as an educational 
association consisting of study groups and pamphleteering about the League and its 
accomplishments. While most of the pacifist organizations that sprang up between the 
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wars were ignored by the foreign office, the League of Nations Union was an 
exception to this because of its mass popular appeal and its strong leadership ties to 
the “establishment.”108 Founded in 1918 by Lord Robert Cecil and Gilbert Murray, 
The League of Nations Union was a popular non-partisan pressure group and 
voluntary association. The group’s aims were not only to make known the works of 
the League of Nations, but also to mold public opinion through education and 
propaganda. They aspired to reinforce and encourage British policymaking based on 
the League’s principles.109 In an early leaflet describing the main objectives of this 
voluntary association, it aspired to “1. To secure the whole-hearted acceptance by the 
British people of the League of Nations as the guardian of international right … 2. To 
foster mutual understanding, goodwill and habits of co-operation and fair dealings 
between the peoples of different countries” and to advocate for the full development 
of the League.110   
The emphasis on capturing the “whole-hearted acceptance” and fostering 
“habits of co-operation” with peoples from other countries suggests that they strove to 
alter the very psychology and habits of the British people.111 Rather than force the 
League of Nations on a population, the League of Nations embodied an international 
psychology and ethic that had to be learned and cultivated. The League of Nation 
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Union’s mission was to promote the League of Nations and idea of world citizenship 
through education, propaganda campaigns, and social reform. Left-wing and radical-
liberal contributors such as the Trades Union Congress, Ramsay MacDonald, George 
N. Barnes, and Leonard Woolf actively participated in this organization.   
Well aware of the importance of the support of a knowledgeable public 
opinion, the League of Nations Union fashioned its education programs around a 
particular type of grassroots study group program that had gained popularity for its 
effectiveness in cultivating minority leadership in the United States. Unlike many of 
the self-help programs in Britain, these juntos focused on members leading and 
teaching each other rather than formal instruction. 112  By the early 1920s, the League 
of Nations Union also became an activist policy-making group that focused on 
informing and providing recommendations to the stalled governmental foreign 
policymakers and actively wed British foreign policymaking with the aims of the 
League.113   
It was through popular civic and voluntary associations that the ideals of the 
League of Nations could be learned and the voices of the people heard. Just as the 
social psychology of the people had been seen to be conditioned for war and militant 
nationalism, Labour leaders promoted a new social psychology of internationalism 
that would better reflect a culture of more interdependent global relations. Fr League 
supporters, a truly democratic and transparent League of Nations could only come 
                                                
112 A 1923 guide provided by the League of Nations Union described the origins and function of study 
circle: "It is about fifteen years since study circles were first introduced into this country from 
America...Broadly speaking, a study circle may be defined as a small group of friends...for a specific 
number of occasions...for the systematic discussion of a definite subject with the help of a specially 
prepared text-book, and under the guidance of one of their number whom they have appointed their 
leader." Hints for Study Circle Leaders. No. 14 2nd. ed. (October, 1923) 2-3. 
 
113 Birn, The League of Nations Union, 1918-1945, 0. 
 
 57
into being if the British people—and in particular, those within the labour 
movement—cultivated a new international frame of mind that was not based on an 
old paradigm of imperialist internationalism. A pamphlet written by Ramsay 
MacDonald illustrated the general tenor of the Labour party’s propaganda throughout 
the interwar period that intended to prepare British citizens for the new role they wer  
to have in diplomacy. “The time has come for treating foreign affairs as ordinary 
parts of our national life, for pursuing a policy of open frankness regarding them, and 
for compelling the people to assume responsibility for their relations with ther 
neighbours.”114 MacDonald spoke about the need to integrate foreign affairs into 
ordinary life and to change the very attitude of the British people and making them 
“assume responsibility” for relations once taken care of by the governments.  
Knowing that the power of tradition and habit can be unyielding to the social 
psychology of the masses, new habits of mind had to be developed upon familiar 
traditions, collective interests, and cultures. The Labour party tried to bridge the gap 
between the old and the new order by relating familiar conceptual models of 
international working class associations with the new international order of the
League. Drawing upon familiar modes of international solidarity and social reform, 
the Labour party members tried to make this conception of world citizenship more 
meaningful to the public sphere. Labour supporter and League of Nations advocate C. 
Delisle Burns drew upon what he saw as a familiar internationalist “frame of mind” 
already inherent in the psychology of ordinary people: “The international mind has 
developed in the Labour Movement not because of any abstract theory, but because of 
practical experience. It has in practice been found in international gatherings that men 
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of different nations can and do reach similar conclusions in regard to problems which 
are common to all.”115 Not only did his mention of the well established international 
spirit of the labour movements serve as a familiar analogy, but it served as a working 
example of how to promote a new way of thinking beyond class, party, and national 
lines.  
Labour leaders thought that the working class had inherited traits that gave 
them not only a distinct advantage over understanding the true international virtues of 
the League, but an obligation to the wider British community to uphold and guide 
League proceedings based on these principles. In an undated circular put out by an 
international labour body called the Conference upon Reparations, whose 
representatives included the likes of Arthur Henderson, Ramsay MacDonald, Thomas 
Shaw, and J.H. Thomas, the writers call upon the working class’s traditional position 
as a political outsider to guide international proceedings normally laden with vested 
interests of political leaders. They argued that, “The Working Class, being more 
disinterested, less Jingo, and more international in its ideas, ought to guide the 
negotiations into more fruitful channels, including arbitration on questions of law or 
fact if agreement is found not to be possible, and press its decisions upon the 
Governments with all its available influence.”116 Not only was the working class seen 
as “disinterested,” “less jingo” and “more international,” but they were encouraged to 
press decisions when the political leaders were all muddled by their own competing 
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interests to the point of indecision. The League of Nations became a means for the 
Labour party to integrate the working class into society and broaden the meaning of 
British citizenship. By making the League’s concept of internationalism relevant to 
the organized working class, the Labour party not only attempted to unite the interests 
of the masses in international bodies but also the British nation.  
Labour and radical liberals were involved with the League of Nations Union, 
which was a grassroots propaganda campaign targeting the working class. A 
manifesto printed in a leaflet published by the League of Nations Union entitled The 
Co-Operation of Labour with the League of Nations Union argued that the League of 
Nations drew upon familiar working class international associations to promote new 
ones. The unauthored manifesto read: “The League of Nations will not supplant the 
“Internationale,” but will supplement it. It will help to do amongst the Governments 
what the “Internationale” is seeking to do in the industrial world.”117  The League of 
Nations was propagandized as something that built upon and extended the same type 
of commitment and solidarity already established by the “Internationale.”  
Labour members involved in the propaganda effort may have sometimes used 
the language of class to translate the idea of internationalism to certain populations, 
but class did not serve as a political end in itself. One of the League of Nations 
Union’s principles listed in the same manifesto read that the League of Nations “can 
only succeed if it be a real League of Peoples, not merely a League of Governments. 
To this end it is necessary that every individual shall take an instructed and active 
interest, till he can say “This is my League through which I bring my influece to 
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bear on international politics to ensure peace and to prevent war.”118 Working 
alongside organizations such as the League of Nations Union, the Labour party hoped 
to create informed, democratic, and international minds.   
These internationally educated minds would provide the voices for a British 
public opinion that was amicable to a peaceful international society. Other pamphlets 
the distributed by League of Nations Union which provided support for this effort had 
such titles as “An Appeal to ‘The Nobodies’” (1920), “The League of Nations and 
Industrial Peace” (1920), and “Men and Women! This is YOUR Question” (1923). 
For League supporters, it would only succeed if it became a “real League of Peoples” 
and not an international organ representing the vested interests of a class or 
government official.119 The latent internationalist spirit may have gained its 
inspiration and foundation from a specific class movement, but for Labour especially, 
it ultimately intended to go beyond class in ambitions and audience. 
Internationalism and a new British imperial patriotism  
The Left not only invoked familiar models of social relations to capture the 
attention of ordinary Britishers, it integrated the idea of a world citizen to temper 
domestic fears about degeneration at home. After the war, Bolshevism challenged 
diplomatic relations and domestic stability within the country as well. Even though 
Conservatives exploited this “red scare” to raise suspicions about the Labour party’s 
relationship with the Third International, Labour members were quick to try to deny 
any accusations that members of the labour movement were associated with the Third 
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International.120 John Clynes, a prominent labour MP, tried to dispel claims that the 
labour movement was overrun with communists at a 1925 League of Nations Union 
meeting. He thought that the cause of the labour unrest and the mass attraction to the 
idea of joining the Third International was less politically motivated as much as it was 
motivated by practical strategy. For a activist vying for changes in domestic policy, it 
was advantageous for the more radical working class to be associated with a 
controversial international body that opposed the status quo at home. Clynes argued 
that their attraction to “Bolshevism” was caused by a lack of knowledge about the 
benefits available to them by the League of Nations to address socioeconomic 
problems. The attraction to Bolshevism was not political or ideological, but social:  
The working classes of this country were quite unaware of the great sum of 
human good that had resulted in Geneva…A peril that had nothing more than 
a mere colour in it need not frighten the people. If there was any peril at all it 
arose from poverty, discontent, and the actual hardships which, unhappily, 
abounded in the life of millions of people in this country. The discussions at 
the Liverpool conference has showed how little the work of the League of 
Nations was really understood in certain quarters, and how deep and foolish 
was the suspicion with which it was regarded.121 
 
The socioeconomic misery compounded the ideological misdirection caused by a lack 
of education about the League of Nations. The working class’s internationalist ties to
Bolshevism were related to their interests in solving domestic problems and not as a 
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result of a political ideal. In fact, for Clynes, the domestic unrest and the appeal of 
Bolshevism by some sectors of the working class did not stem from differences in 
ideas or ideologies. The working class’ interest in Bolshevism was merely a strategy 
so that it could maintain its place as the minority opposition in domestic politics. The 
power of the League of Nations to promote domestic unity lay in its ability to instill
the idea of international civic responsibility through its humanitarian works.   
 The League of Nations and its branches may have been designed to buffer 
competing interests internationally, but it also served as an impartial intermediary 
intending to promote a deeper citizenship. When he was faced with strike activity in 
1925, Arthur Henderson described how the enforcement of labour rights should rest 
with the International Labour Organisation instead of with the people themselves. He 
argued that they “should need to subordinate private and sectional interests to public 
and national well-being, and to create a united people inspired by a single-minded 
devotion to the service of the commonweal.”122 Even though Henderson was speaking 
about domestic problems, his solution reflected similar aims for the resolution of 
international unrest. The cultivation of “national well-being” could only be 
established by relinquishing the fight for the protection of individual interests to 
spirited labour rights organizations such as the International Labour Office.123  
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The highest form of patriotism was not about strategizing to maintain a 
balance of power or for economic national self-interest, but the cultivation of an 
internationalism based on service and world citizenship. As C. Delisle Burns, a 
League of Nations supporter and Labour party member stated, “One’s country is then
an instrument of service, not a bundle of interests and claims; and patriotism then 
means something less barbaric than it has meant in the past. That is the patriotism of 
Labour, and that patriotism is genuinely international.”124   
Without diluting or dismissing the primacy and collective unity of the British 
Empire by illustrating all that was bad about imperialism, the Left was able to diffuse 
it by identifying its exploitive and limiting factors and deeming them outmoded. The 
Labour party drew from an equally familiar humanitarian and internationalist national 
narrative to supplement a new “internationalist” history of the British Empire 
promoted and supported by the League of Nations.  This new global history of the 
British Empire intended to invigorate a defunct isolationist and exceptionalist mode
of thinking and policymaking. Ultimately, it intended to provide a familiar cognitive 
framework (or narrative) to segue into a paradigm of world citizenship hinged by the 
framework of the League.  
In fact, the British as a people regardless of class were seen by League 
supporters as particularly fit for this transition to world citizenship because of th  
British tradition of ‘peaceful’ international relations within its empire. C. Delisle 
Burns contended that “the British Commonwealth is thus a brilliant and immortal 
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example of the organisation of peace, so its experience and its goodwill may assist 
other nations outside the Commonwealth to achieve the difficult task of establishing 
the peace of the whole of humanity.”125 For Burns, the discourse and organ of the 
League of Nations provided a means to express a nationalism that avoided sounding 
like the Tory imperialists Labour not only ideologically disagreed with, but was the 
major party that they competed with for votes. While still appealing to the 
conditioned psychological associations that the idea of the empire invoked, Burns was 
able to avoid promoting imperialism. By deemphasizing the politically isolationis  
and elitist forms of British nationalism, he tried to put the empire back on a track 
based on its “brilliant and immortal” internationalist, humanitarian, and specifically 
labor past. 
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Chapter 4:  The League and a New Social Imperialism 
 
 
You are the only league of nations that has ever existed; and if the 
line that I am sketching here is correct you are going to be a greater 
league of nations in the future; and if you are true to your old traditions 
of self-government and freedom, and to this vision of your future  
and your mission, who knows that you may not exercise far greater  
and more beneficent influence on the history of mankind.   
–General Jan Christiaan Smuts (1917)126 
 
 
The civilizing mission continued to lie at the heart of prewar imperial 
propaganda. Yet by the turn of the twentieth century, the same liberal agenda of 
“civilizing the native” essentially turned inward to manage the health and unity of the 
British people themselves instead of the empire abroad. During the years leading up 
to the war, a jingoist imperialist culture was the motivating theme for the social and 
educational reforms that many thought were necessary to compete with the oter 
European empires. From chauvinist education, to scouting groups, to imperially 
themed voluntary associations, these groups embodied the two-fold agenda of 
fortifying the imperial projects abroad and resolving the increasingly poor social 
conditions at home. The end of the war altered the political (and largely imperial) 
debate over these reforms. Even though national efficiency and social reform were 
even more necessary for reconstruction, they could no longer be linked to an elitist 
imperial program. The whole culture based on the League of Nations idea not only 
helped provide an alternative solution to the growing social problems at home, but it 
also helped bridge a widening gap between the needs of the British people and the 
rest of the empire.   
                                                




At the turn of the twentieth century, the quality of British education had 
undergone increased scrutiny. Along with demonstrating Britain’s increasing failure 
to find peaceful imperial solutions between itself and its dependents, the Boer War 
highlighted the poor physical health and education of the British people. Military 
drilling and physical training became incorporated into the elementary code of 1871 
and its supplementary code in 1902 respectively.127 Between the years 1872-1914, the 
curriculum incorporated imperial history as a way for students to be taught “how the 
British nation grew up, and how the mother country in her turn has founded daughter 
countries beyond the seas.”128 Moreover, attendance in London’s public schools had 
improved on average to 88% by 1904 from rates well below 80% only years 
before.129    
That is not to say that British officials ignored education in the empire. 
Education had always been part of the liberal empire’s “civilizing” mission in the 
nineteenth century in the form of missionary work, anti-slavery leagues, and other 
humanitarian ventures.130 By the early twentieth century, imperial education once 
again became a key aspect to strengthening imperial unity, but now it served an 
additional purpose of improving the poor and inconsistent educational standards at 
home. Organizations like the League of Empire and the Victoria League were formed 
at the height of the Boer War (1899-1902) where questions about the strength of 
imperial unity were at its highest. These organizations, like many others formed 
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during this period, linked social reforms in education to imperial concerns and 
national efficiency at home.  
The League of Empire was a penpal club formed in 1901 for children in 
Britain and in the colonies. This organization later became the clearinghouse for 
standards in imperial education. It was also one of the participants in the 1911 
Imperial Education Conference, which sought to standardize educational measures 
and curricula across the empire.131 The Victoria League’s mission, on the other hand 
was somewhat broader in scope, but similar in mission. The Victoria League, also 
formed in 1901, aspired to aid in imperial projects that would unite the diverse 
peoples of the empire and promote the civilizing virtues of Britishness. They sought 
to “create a better understanding” between themselves and the Dominion peoples. By 
dedicating itself to “practical” imperial work such as education and reform, it could 
help unite Britain and the Dominions peoples under a stronger bond of imperial 
subjecthood.132  
Yet educational reforms during the years just prior to the war’s outbreak, 
especially in the sciences, were complicated by questions vocalized by many 
conservatives over the moral consequences of supporting such initiatives. British
educationists increasingly admired Germany’s technical thoroughness and ability to 
maximize the educational and material potential of its workforce to become a 
significant military and industrial competitor. The war also sparked debate among 
people in the British education and scientific community who on one hand admired 
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Germany’s militaristic efficiency but loathed how this characteristic manifested itself 
politically. As one commentator observed in 1916 in the Times Educational 
Supplement, “[i]n the organization of material resources Germany has won well-
merited admiration, but in regard to moral conduct, and in regard to all that art of 
dealing with other men and other nations which is closely allied to moral conduct, she 
has won for herself the horror of the civilized world.”133  While embodying the 
efficiency of a modern civilized state, it had unleashed what was widely observed as 
the most uncivilized behaviors in foreign policy.   
  After the war, the idea of civilization would again serve as a defining marker 
in postwar imperial propaganda and reforms. Yet now, the national efficiency and 
social reform that such a standard had shaped prewar imperial culture could no longer 
be married to a chauvinistic imperial ideology. From the growing political influence 
of Left-wing politicians to the war itself, every aspect of imperial culture that had 
been built up to relate the benefits of the empire to the British people had been either 
discredited or destroyed. Politically, the idea that “western civilization” was the 
reigning standard was compromised. Also being questioned were the policies of 
national efficiency and social reform. While improving the standards of living of the 
British people, they had been based on a racialized hierarchy of efficiency and 
nationalism. Intellectually and culturally, the stereotypes about race and its 
relationship to civilized behavior and the ability to self-govern had changed. Th  
League of Nations provided an alternative way to conceptualize postwar imperial 
relationships in political terms as well as in popular terms. Coalition and Right-w ng 
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officials now linked national efficiency and social reform to the League of Nations 
and the liberal empire’s long history of humanitarian social reform and education at 
home and abroad.     
A new commitment to social reform and national efficiency 
The Left may have taken up the idea of an internationalist vision of the empire 
as its own, but this vision was also important to the conservative imperialist’s ttempt 
to energize a less hostile notion of the empire and the people’s relationship to it. In a 
1923 lecture, titled “The Moral Basis of the League of Nations,” Lord Robert Cecil
proclaimed to an audience gathered for Empire Day that the British Empire served as 
the ideal model for the League of Nations. “It is peculiarly appropriate” he said, “that 
this lecture should be delivered on Empire Day. The British Empire is not only a 
political entity, it is a great example of how nations can be held together without 
force, merely by the desire to co-operate for the benefit of all the inhabitants of the 
empire and for the advancement at large.”134 Like many of his contemporary League 
supporters, Cecil thought the empire’s humanitarian tradition exemplified not only 
the right human relations, but also international relations.   
By juxtaposing Britain’s history of moral (and often religious) humanitarian 
groups with the League, Cecil also tried to emphasize a continuity of a particular vein 
of imperial ideology that survived the war when many aspects of popular imperialism 
had not. In fact, that was not too far from the truth. Only the imperialist leagues and 
associations that embraced a gentler and less militaristic tone such as the Victoria 
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League survived the First World War. Unlike the more militaristic leagues and clubs 
that served as the focal points for Edwardian social imperialist patriotism and 
efficiency, the patriotic leagues lasting beyond the war were the ones that espoused 
virtues of imperial inclusion instead of militant British patriotism.135 They stressed 
widespread participation in the imperial project, rather than passive discussion. These 
organizations depoliticized notions of nationality based on chauvinism and race and 
bolstered similar views of the British Empire “based on spiritual ties and mutual 
social service, a “community of citizens.”136   
In fact, these groups demonstrated a kind of solid efficiency that could 
withstand war and provided solutions to preventing future ones. These voluntary 
humanitarian societies, associations, and organizations working before and during the 
war were not only cited as consultants to the League for questions on organization, 
but active members of the League. In a publication meant to educate the public about 
the League of Nations, Beatrice Bradfield credited these agencies with providing the 
framework for its humanitarian organizations. She noted that “the representativ  of 
the voluntary associations give full reports of their work to and take a large share in 
the liberations of the Committee; the magnificent work done by these Societies is 
well known, and a great impetus is to be given to it by this close relationship….”137 
Organizers could have easily modeled the League on the efficient and “rational” 
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philosophy that also ran the manufacturing plant in Germany as a model, but instead
organizers relied on the reputation and efficiency of those who worked in 
humanitarian organizations.     
While strong plans to achieve efficiency and social reform may have been 
able to solve the shortsighted aims of the state, they did not address the psychosocial 
factor of human interests that could easily deride them.138 While writing about 
political democracy in Britain, L.T. Hobhouse reinforced this point. He thought that 
political democracy could only be obtained through an international government 
whose every function draws from the interests of individuals within those larger 
groups. In “every function [there is] something that appeals intimately to those
particularly interested in it, and thereby calls out their public spirit and intelligence to 
better effect than the mixed and confused appeal of ordinary State politics.”139 
Addressing common international human interests could diffuse the often defensive 
and viciously nationalistic passions and help return patriotism to its place among the 
healthy communal identifications that preserved democracy within individual 
states.140      
Britain’s use of social reform as a tool to reduce the friction within the empire 
caused by competing group interests was not itself replaced by the League of Nations; 
it was refined by and assisted by it. The League of Nations provided impartial 
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institutions that could address transnational human welfare concerns. J.F. Unstead 
argued that it set into place institutions for “removing causes of friction and arranging 
for common action in a number of spheres.”141 The League’s International Labour 
Office, the Health Organization the International Commission on Intellectual 
Cooperation, Permanent Central Opium Board, the Commission for Refugees, and the 
Slavery Commission all focused on remedying and preventing the psychological, 
biological, and intellectual  problems that were common to  all people.   
The “causes of friction” that Unstead was specifically writing about here w
not only the problems erupting between states, but within the empire itself. Writing 
specifically about Britain’s experience with managing the rise in natio list 
consciousness in India and the African dependencies, Unstead thought that the empire 
had to cease its “past dominance” and to ally itself with the growing and inevitabl  
development of its dependents. The League’s organizations decentralized the welfar
responsibilities formally held by state powers like Britain.142 As an impartial political 
institution, the League helped resolve the problems of possible ignorance and 
corruptibility of public opinion that had often interfered with the formation of a 
responsible empire.143  
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Education and creating an international empire  
League supporters noted that the people of the British Empire were primed for 
leading the world even though its place in the world could no longer be measured by 
economic or military dominance. Yet, the British people first needed to understand 
this new value that qualified the empire for its top place in world affairs. In an article 
documenting a meeting between Robert Cecil and Woodrow Wilson, Cecil noted that 
“if the British people show they are in earnest in pressing forward this reform, they 
will carry it through, as they have carried it through many another scheme for the 
freedom and improvement of mankind.”144 For Cecil, the actions of the British people 
could serve as an example to the world for what to strive for in international social 
reform, but they first had to show that they were “in earnest in pressing forward this 
reform.” The British people had to demonstrate an active interest and support for 
these new foreign policies being developed by the League of Nations officials. 
The reform and regulatory institutions of the League encouraged the creation 
of a type of civic society that had gotten stifled by the prewar and wartime imperial 
policies and culture. In a tract called The League of Nations To-Day: Its Growth, 
Record and Relation to British Policy, Roth Williams, also known as K. Zilliacus, 
wrote about the League of Nations and how it could be used to change a stymied and 
corrupted British foreign policy. Zilliacus argued that the decentralized nature of the 
League’s Independent Assemblies maintained an efficient body of institutions largely 
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working independently but all agreeing on the League’s basic principles.145 It would 
also have an instructive quality for the public voting on the representatives for the 
Assembly itself:   
What is needed here, as elsewhere, is an intelligent and active public opinion, 
among all parties, both in Parliament and outside, a public opinion well 
informed on facts, knowing what it wants and determined to get it. In such an 
atmosphere there would be no difficulty in composing a perfectly satisfactory 
delegation to the Assembly, adequately supported by expert and clerical 
assistance, and armed with a full programme and bold instructions.146 
 
For Zilliacus and others, an educated and active public opinion was vital to the proper 
governance of world and imperial affairs. It reintroduced a type of liberal citizenship 
as the basis for creating an efficient state. This citizenship was based on the 
association and mutual dependency of the state and the organized, yet informed 
interests of the people within it.  
Focusing on reforms in education was key to promoting a more efficiently run 
nation which at the same time did not sacrifice the moral integrity of the British 
people. Covering the new reforms in education in Britain, The Times reported on a 
paper delivered by T.P. Nunn at the Educational Section of the British Association for 
the Advancement of Science. The paper argued that Germany, the United States, and 
Italy’s Fascist regime used public education to “primarily establish the in erests of the 
community as a whole” while in England such an education to foster a “national 
spirit” was of very little need.147 Now after the war, Nunn observed that the “great 
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problem in the present and the immediate future was to harmonize this newer with the 
older educational motives, to reconcile free individual development with the 
organization needed for national strength, and the development of the national life 
with international cooperation.”148 
Discussing the genealogy of the English people’s “partnerships” with other 
nations starting from its union with the Scots and the Welsh to the postwar British 
Commonwealth of Nations, Maxwell Garnett noted how all of these were also 
achieving nationalities of their own. The League of Nations was not something that 
had to be freshly introduced to the British people because it embodied in form 
something that was already part of a progression of an ever-outward and increasingly 
decentralized creation of “patriotisms” existing in the empire. They haved a long 
history of a “union of other nations with their own.”149 He observed that, “for the 
Englishman, for the Britisher, for the citizens of the British Commonwealth of 
nations, there can be no valid reason why the union of nations and the building of 
loyalties out of present patriotisms should not keep pace with the widening of 
individual human interests.”150  
Rather than assume that to cultivate national efficiency one had to improve the 
material conditions, educationists after the war emphasized the importance of 
personality and the creation of an active imperial citizenship. This citizenship was 
shaped by the values and the contributions of the broader empire. Among other goals, 
this educational scheme aimed to shape a kind of citizenship that fostered an 
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awareness of the international, economic, and political climates that were a condition 
of national efficiency at home. It aspired to create an awareness of the citizen’s 
“relationship to the other constituent parts of the Commonwealth of British nations 
called the empire and the degree to which it can in the future enter into closer 
relations with other civilized nations for the just treatment of less developed rac s, for 
the furtherance of international co-operation.”151   
Education became the means for the British people at home and abroad to 
foster a common imperial citizenship that at the same time did not compromise the 
process of strengthening national culture. Like many of his contemporaries, H. A. L. 
Fisher turned to education to cultivate an imperial culture based on a common focus 
on improving and standardizing education throughout the empire. He argued that “if 
the unity of the state was founded in education, so must also be the unity of the 
empire. I should like to see equality of educational opportunities all through the 
empire.”152 Only a year before, Fisher had sponsored the 1918 Education Act, which 
made secondary education compulsory for children up to the age of 14. He 
recognized that such measures could not stop at the British state level, but must be
extended to throughout the empire.153         
In fact, this new focus on creating educated, more historically minded, and 
engaged imperial citizens was also clearly reflected in the rise in the citizenship 
education throughout Britain and the empire. With a reasonable level of success, the 
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League of Nations Union helped revise textbooks that taught a transnational and less 
jingoist, but still patriotic historical narrative in efforts to promote world 
citizenship.154 The imperial textbooks also projected more tempered attitudes about 
race and the British Empire. Moreover, space was often granted in the textbooks for 
individual national narratives when discussing Dominion contributions to the war.155   
Changes were also taking place on a wider imperial level. The 1919 
curriculum for the Imperial Education Conference focused on equitable exchanges in 
education in the schools in the empire. This Conference emphasized more acceptance 
of colonial diversity instead of being very insular and based on colonial assimilation. 
Before the war, an imperial educationist focused on providing a domestic education 
that would “not mainly to foster the imperial sentiment, but to give practical effect to 
that imperial sentiment by bringing together the knowledge and experience of 
different parts of the British Empire.”156 The proposed program was based on a 
uniformity and appropriation of information and education about the empire for 
domestic needs. After the war, the emphasis in its educational schemes shifted to 
more cooperation with Dominion and colonial educational institutions. It was argued 
that they “do not seek uniformity in our educational thinking, there is a need of 
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greater co-operation and of greater unity in purpose.”157 The subtle difference 
between these two well-received objectives was the shift from trying to create an 
empire-wide consensus on imperial education to one that supported the variety of 
educational schemes in each territory under the umbrella of imperial cooperati n. 
Educational cooperation was used as an anchor for the development of a common 
imperial citizenship based on local reform initiatives throughout the empire.158  
Towards an imperial partnership 
During the 1921 Imperial Conference, David Lloyd George announced to his 
audience, “that there was a time when Downing Street controlled the empire; to-day
the empire is in charge of Downing Street.”159 While surely this remark was made to 
calm the growing nationalist agitation emanating from all ends of the empir, its 
essential claim that Downing Street relied on the cooperation of its dependents had 
some truth to it. The short postwar market bubble burst in 1920 with too many goods 
produced and not enough foreign customers. By 1921, unemployment skyrocketed to 
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2 million or 17% of the labor force.160 Even the government-backed education 
proposals and housing projects succumbed to the financial retrenchment, if they had 
not already been abandoned because of labor shortages.161 Ultimately, the overseas 
slump and the staggering unemployment made the empire markets seem like better 
prospects for British commerce.   
Between the wars, British officials were doing more than attempting to 
articulate the new legal and political status of the Dominions, India, and the Crown 
Colonies; they were also trying to shape a new meaning of the empire in the everyday 
lives of the British people. As Denis Jude observes,  
By 1924 the balance of trade in British manufacturers showed a surplus of 
£262 million with the empire as a whole. Within this total there was a surplus 
of £75 million with India, of £120.6 million with the dominions, and of £76.5 
million with the rest of the empire. Between 1925 and 1929, the empire was 
taking in 37.2 per cent of all British exports—chiefly manufactured goods (of 
which the dominions received 20.6 per cent), and Britain was receiving from 
the whole Empire imports—mainly food and raw materials—totaling 32.9 per 
cent, including 16.9 percent from the dominions.162   
 
The significance of these statistics should not be disregarded. Since 1916, the empire 
had become an important source for British trade and in times of economic crisis it 
would continue to be so. From the British Empire Producers Organisation (1916), the 
empire Resources Development Committee (1922), to the 1924 British Empire 
Wembley Exhibition, all of these bear witness to the to importance of the empire-
Commonwealth trading connection.  
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For the purposes of security, imperial unity was just as important. Up until the 
latter half of 1921, widespread industrial unrest fueled fears throughout the country 
that a revolution was imminent, and these concerns would intermittently continue 
until after the General Strike in 1926.163 The whole system of wartime “imperial 
unity” through the nationalization of heavy industry at home and further political 
concessions for soldiers with the empire, had virtually unraveled. The 1918-1922 
coalition government was stymied by widespread concerns and criticisms over its use 
of expenditures for an army now responsible for an even greater expanse of territory. 
Rebellions flared in Mesopotamia and Egypt during the early years of 1920, and the 
government had to manage stronger nationalist appeals and assertions for Home Rule 
in India and Ireland.164 The Dominions and colonies were as reluctant to acquiesce to 
a centralized imperial system just as much as the British people were distasteful of 
more war and were more interested in the government improving the faltering 
economy.  
The liberal empire was, again, in crisis. Many critics thought that Liberalism 
as an institution by the end of the war (if not already before) had gotten corrupted. 
They thought that the empire was a long way off from the principles of liberal 
democracy that had been the bedrock of the spread of British civilization at home and 
abroad. Writing about his tempered liberalism as a result of the war, Gilbert Murray 
wanted British affairs to return to the qualities of British Liberalism that preserved 
civilization rather than destroyed it. He thought that the government “must get back to 
the standard of veracity, of consistency of honesty and economy, and of intellectual 
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competence, that we had from Peel or Lord Salisbury, or Gladstone…we need in 
foreign policy and home policy a higher standard than we had before, the standard 
implied by the League of Nations in international affairs and the ideal of Co-
operation in domestic affairs.”165 
It was uncertain how the change to imperial politics was to be done, but it was 
clear that imperial relations had to change if Britain and the empire were going to 
weather the chaotic political and social storms of the postwar period. Reporting on a 
meeting at the House of Lords in 1920, The Times transcribed Milner’s argument 
about how crucial it was for the empire to seek out ways to be unified without 
sacrificing the rights of each Dominion or colony. Writing in the wake of increasing 
tensions with Ireland and India after the war, Milner hoped that the members of the 
upcoming Constitutional Conference in 1921 would consider a new type of imperial 
relations. He sought a relationship between Britain and its empire that could 
recognize a group’s instinct to band together based on like national interests without
sacrificing the benefits of imperial unity. He hoped that the conference would provi e 
“the British Empire with some organ of government based upon the recognition of the 
complete independence and equality of its different parts, but which, nevertheless, 
would enable them to act promptly and effectively when they were all agreed, and to 
exercise in peace…the beneficent and harmonious cooperation which was so 
brilliantly illustrated in the War.”166 Rather than emphasize an imperial culture that 
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created strict racial and national differences, this new postwar imperial culture now 
was based on the uncoerced “harmonious cooperation” of each state.  
A critic of the government’s handling of the Indian nationalist agitations 
argued that if the British government recognized India’s traditional forms f political 
organization rather than stifle it, British officials will find that it will actually 
strengthen unity. Sir Frederick Lugard suggested an alternative to Britain’s armed 
force against the agitation over the implementation of the Government of India Act 
(1919) that occurred during the later months of 1921 through January of 1922. For 
Lugard, the British government should consider, “restoring that form of self-
government to which India had been accustomed to for centuries, but on better and 
more efficient lines, safeguarding where need be by ever-decreasing Brit sh guidance, 
so that our responsibility for the illiterate millions may be discharged—while not 
denying to the politically-minded progressives those forms of Western democratic 
government in areas where they may offer prospects for success.”167 These 
concessions validated the nationalist consciousness already simmering before th  war 
and showed that race did not limit a group’s desire to form a nation if given the 
opportunity to freely develop a nationalist sentiment. Lugard suggested that officials 
tap into and reinforce Indian’s indigenous culture instead of trying to assimilate the 
Indians. The government should only be responsible for the social and economic 
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reforms necessary to support the needs of a population attempting to move towards 
self-government.   
The whole cultures based on the principles of League of Nations ideas helped 
reclaim and reform a less contradictory notion of the liberal empire. It provided 
imperialists with the conceptual framework necessary to resituate the idea of empire 
based on the familiar constitutional principles of liberal internationalist lw and 
popular association. A. F. Pollard, observed that the League of Nations would help 
“re-create the conditions of a century ago, restore the individual independence of a 
number of fairly equal Powers, and guarantee the commonwealth of nations against
privy conspiracy and sedition in the form of separate groups and alliances.”168 In fact, 
it was generally thought that the League of Nations could help divorce the links 
between imperialism, nationalism, and liberalism in Britain by returning the British 
Empire back to its political roots of classical liberalism. For widespread supporters of 
the League, there was a return to a liberal understanding of imperial differences 
between subject and citizen that "was to be protected and celebrated as a source of 
human strength and (largely metaphysical) unity.”169    
In fact, the League of Nations not only became a conceptual framework for 
imperialists to explain the vitality and legitimacy of the empire in a postwar world, 
but for explaining the more sustaining relations within the changing empire itself:     
Just as the League is an organized whole composed of parts, so the British 
Commonwealth is an organism within it. The defensive power of the British 
Commonwealth is a real, but even so the lesser, part of the intrinsic value. Its 
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ultimate value lies in the contribution to progress which can result from the 
intimate association of peoples widely differing in their life, and yet 
possessing the sympathy that comes from a common mentality, race, 
language, and tradition.170  
 
Rather than build up its armaments, force onto its territories a single civilized ideal 
type as a “defensive measure,” the editorial’s author, Arthur Steel-Maitland, a former 
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, pointed to the strength found in a common 
imperial mind and culture.” This more intangible and psychological understanding of 
the British constitution bridged the gaps existing between the variety of people living 
in the empire. It provided a more organic and sustaining “intimate association” based 
on a common imperial tradition.     
Imperialists saw the League of Nations as a vehicle to help the dominions, and 
the colonies develop their own sound local nationalisms necessary for self-rule, 
without compromising imperial loyalty. In a 1925 League of Nations Union 
pamphlet, the author A. Berriedale Keith argued that the provisions of the League did 
not compromise the integrity of the empire; in fact, the provisions reinforced the 
gradual reforms in management and social work in its possessions. The “provisions 
regarding the empire tend to secure for the Dominions and India an opportunity of 
developing individuality and national sentiment and acquiring international 
recognition of these qualities, without derogating vitality from the essential un ty of 
the empire.”171 The League’s provisions reinforced the empire’s long held imperial 
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story intending to help the Dominions and India develop “individuality and national 
sentiment” without deteriorating their ties to the empire.   
By reinforcing royalty and imperialism, the class, gender, national, ad ethnic 
divisions were superseded by particular codes of conduct and duties that defined a 
civilized British subject. Stripped of its biological determinism, citizenship and 
subjecthood related to “a set of formal rights and obligations—bearing relationship 
between individuals and the nation state, but also as a language by means of which 
people can make claims on the political community concerning rights and duties, 
political and moral or ethical practices and criteria of membership.”172   
Writing about the development of the colonial administration, Leopold Amery 
described how the new international responsibilities were dependent on the same 
“civilizing mission” that had been once embraced by the empire.   
The whole thing is a trusteeship or mandate, though the mandate is, in the 
main, not to an international commission sitting at Geneva, but to what I 
believe is an even more effective body—the Parliaments and public opinions 
of this country and of the empire. Now, in that work, I feel the rest of the 
empire should be so interested—and not only as spectators, but also I hope, in 
increasing measure, active partakers.173    
 
Amery invoked the heavily laden terms “trusteeship” and “mandate” that had once 
described the imperial mission a century before and would now set the course for the 
future one under new conditions. Just as Britain had guided the Dominion and 
colonial dependents into an active and informed citizenship, now the colonies had the 
tools to uphold a similar duty to the mandates they acquired as part of the League. 
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The place of the British Empire in the League was, in essence, a template for 
conceptualizing the dependent’s position within the empire itself. In fact, the League 
of Nations was the prime mover for this transition from “spectators” to “active 
partakers.”    
 The League’s focus on the psychosocial and humanitarian roots of the empire 
helped articulate a broader notion of imperial citizenship that was based on a common 
cultural heritage. Unlike the League’s other members and mandated territories, all of 
Britain’s subjects were primed to deal with the “evolution” of the League of Nations 
idea. It was argued by the League’s supporters that all British subjects had been 
exposed to this vast, organic, relationship between the individual and the community, 
and it was called the British constitution. Writing about the League of Nations’ 
evolution into an internationalist body upheld by public opinion, Austen Chamberlain 
conceived of the empire less in terms of hierarchy but of a shared mentality and 
culture:  
To us who live under the British Constitution this idea of organic growth and 
of the gradual emergence of an unwritten law, supplementing and not seldom 
superseding the written word, is a familiar conception. Our whole 
Constitution, national and Imperial, depends upon it, and our Imperial union 
derives from its strength, and indeed the possibility of its existence. To foreign 
nations with a different history, with different institutions and traditions, and 
with other habits of thought, it is not so readily acceptable or even easily 
comprehensible.174 
 
Ideas, or the gradual emergence of a common psychology, was what defined the laws 
of the British constitution and not the other way around. This heritage implied by the 
British constitution suggested that this deeper cultural patriotism and duty did not 
emerge from laws being imposed on a person. Rather, it was through an organic 
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cultivation of particular moral characteristics and behaviors of a whole grup of 
people that only emerged into the “written word” afterwards.    
The League’s postwar idea of civilization focused on remedying the 
psychosocial factors that prevented imperial integration and solidarity. 175 
Missionaries, voluntary groups, and British officials failed to inoculate a single 
English ideal type in the people encountered during the “civilizing’ interventions 
undertaken before the war. Instead, the idea of civilization increasingly became 
associated with culture and manners of behavior suitable for nationhood. In a 
transcript of a speech delivered at the 1926 Imperial Conference, Leo Amery
described to the conference’s Dominion attendees how vital trusteeship had been to 
their development. He argued that, “we are bringing things forward, lifting people 
from the more elementary to the higher stages of civilization, preparing them for a 
better kind of life as ordinary citizens, preparing them also, by slow degrees, ev n for 
the opportunities of a greater measure of self-government.”176 The dynamic and 
evolutionary nature of the empire lent itself to cultivating citizenship rathe  than 
preventing it. The League’s focus on this more inclusive idea of civilization corrected 
a version of imperial thought that emphasized an increasingly unjustifiable level of 
control and authority. It provided an alternative way to rationalize imperial rule over 
colonies seen as incapable of establishing an effective self-government. The League 
                                                
175 I am not arguing that race was not an issue, for it is true that it was still a source of great anxiety for 
even middle class liberals, but in regards to race as a political category it was increasingly becoming 
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New York: Routledge, 1999), 28.  
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of Nation’s focus on trusteeship and humanitarian intervention legitimized the 
effectiveness of the British Empire’s own history of “successful” trusteeship.177   
Yet the League of Nation’s institutions were not continuations of the Britain’s 
“civilizing mission,” but instead important factors contributing to the British 
Empire’s need to re-envision itself after the war. The League of Nations idea and of 
its foundational principles served as a universal language that could be used by 
British officials to reassert the importance of empire in a larger and more complex 
international community. The growth of dominion nationalisms and in nationalist 
self-confidence in economic and political terms led to a transition from “Empire” to 
“Empire and Commonwealth” in 1926. At the 1926 Imperial conference, A.J. Balfour 
drafted, in what was to be called the 1926 Balfour Declaration, the statutes that 
established the status of the Dominions as self-governing nations within the empir. 
They were “equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of 
their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the 
Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations.”178 Even here, at the moment where the British Empire took its first steps 
toward relinquishing political claim to what was to be one of many nations, the status 
of the commonwealth was still “united by a common allegiance to the Crown.” By 
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1931, the Statute of Westminster would put into legal and constitutional practice the 
definitions and rights put forth by the Balfour Declaration (1926) at the 1926 Imperial 
Conference. In sum, the Declaration and the Statute of Westminster embodied the 
intrinsic liberal democratic values, and triumph, of the liberal empire.  
While the degree to which the British person knew of the origins the tea in 
their cup or bread on their table can be debated, it cannot be argued that the idea of 
imperial unity and the empire in particular, had become seenas vital to postwar 
reconstruction. It was no longer possible to isolate the British public from domestic, 
international, or imperial affairs because the First World War had exposed all the
relationships between Britain and the rest of the British Empire. The League of 
Nations and the whole popular culture that its supporter’s aimed to create helped 
reinforce those links so that the British people would become better citizens of the 
British Empire in hopes of becoming better citizens of the world.            
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Chapter 5:  Reflections on the End of Empire 
 
The historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness  
of the past, but of its presence. 
             —T.S. Eliot (1920)179
  
Over the last ten years, historians have revisited the significance of the League 
of Nation’s institutions in imperial affairs and the process of decolonization. I say 
revisited because the thinkers and politicians between the wars were very conscious 
of, if not anxious about, the effect that the League of Nation’s institutions, mandates, 
and ideas would have on the already changing imperial order. John Darwin’s survey 
of the complex debates surrounding the process of decolonization in the British 
Empire only points to the fact that the liberal empire’s purported constitutional 
trajectory towards colonial “self-determination” was far from clear-cut.180 In fact, 
Darwin asserts that there is no way to easily account for the informal empire in the 
grand liberal imperial narrative of a legal-constitutional transfer of sovereignty. He 
argues that such gaps makes any analysis based on the evolution of the traditional 
direction of imperial trusteeship solely based on the formal empire vacuous.181 
However, recent attempts by the authors of the essays in the volume Imperialism on 
Trial do indirectly fill this gap. Here, they plot the challenges that the League of 
Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, and its successor, the United Nations 
                                                
179T.S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” in The Sacred Wood (London: Methuen, 1920), 42-
53; 44.  
 
180 John Darwin, “Decolonization and the End of Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, ed. Robin W. Winks and Alaine Low (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), vol. V; 541-
557. 
 
181 Ibid., 542.  
 
 91
Trustee Council had on the process of decolonization.182 Yet in the prevailing 
scholarly literature, the view that the cultural transformations of the League’s idea of 
trusteeship at home figures centrally along the process of constitutional 
decolonization, is not so much rejected as overlooked.  
It is not intended here to make a judgment about the nature of the very 
fragmented process of decolonization that continued to happen well past the Second 
World War. Yet this thesis does propose to rethink the relationship between the 
cultural relevance of the British constitution in the process of decolonization as it 
relates to the 1931 Statute of Westminster. This statute drew from the terms outlined 
in the Balfour Declaration (1926) at the 1926 Imperial Conference. These words 
formally acknowledged the status of the white dominions as constitutionally equal 
with Britain. These terms finally put into text the results of years of debate regarding 
the status and relationship of the empire with Britain.  
The widespread appeal of the League of Nations in Britain should not be 
taken for granted when trying to understand the contentious debates about the 
legitimacy of the empire during these immediate postwar years. Looking at the 
attempts to make the empire meaningful to the ordinary Britisher by drawing from the 
culture and dialogue surrounding the League of Nations idea, fills a significant gap in 
the historiography of imperialism after the First World War. For those outside he 
metropole, the idea of the League of Nations served as a rallying point for self-
government. For those “at home,” it provided a language used to interrogate the 
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failures and successes of the conduct of domestic political leaders in serving domestic 
socioeconomic interests during and after the First World War. 
Just because the British Empire survived the war, imperial relations were no 
longer the same. Even though imperial economic and political cooperation were vital 
after the war, imperialists were wrestling with the vast number of changes that were 
caused by wartime concessions and the emergence of the League of Nations. The 
whole idea of the League and the ideas of internationalism and trusteeship that it 
embodied, fueled nationalist sentiments in the empire already simmering b fore the 
war. For all its political shortcomings, the League of Nation’s basic princi les 
challenged existing imperial relationships and public perceptions regardin imperial 
rule at home. On one level, the British Empire could no longer be an empire based on 
a vague notion of trusteeship that lent itself to be carried out by force, coercion, and a 
discourse of assimilation and paternalism. On another, for many of its supporters, the 
ideas of international cooperation and of “self-determination” provided the British 
public a completely new way of figuring the average Britisher’s place in not only 
international affairs, but imperial ones.  
Despite the fact that the British Empire’s stake in and influence on the League 
of Nations was pronounced, very little has been written about its formative place in 
the interrogation and renegotiation of the imperial order at “home.” By the end of the
war, political elites were more dependent on the influence of popular opinion due to 
the wider suffrage and because of a now widespread acceptance of the idea of an 
unavoidable social component to the human psyche. British officials and intellectuals 
latched onto the idea of the League of Nations and its underlying principles aiming to 
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uphold civilization, internationalism, and liberalism through the power of public 
opinion.  
Politicians and intellectuals engaged with the League’s formative principles 
when “party politics” in Britain were chaotic and the whole idea of empire was in 
dispute. Many of the League of Nation’s institutions were established to address 
humanitarian problems as a way to solve international conflict. For many popular 
organizations such as the League of Nations Union, it was also necessary to promote 
education focused on world citizenship and responsible democracy. It was thought 
that the spirit of the League’s organizations could address these “human interests” 
and spiritual interests necessary for international cooperation.  
The contents of the British party propaganda, the League of Nations Union 
pamphlets, public speeches, and tracts reveal how the social psychology of public 
opinion was vital to the sustainability of Britain in international affairs, and the 
empire itself. The grassroots popularity of the League of Nations Union as a 
voluntary association and pressure group in particular reflects a widespread entiment 
of pacifism that took hold throughout the empire after the First World War. 
Intellectuals and psychologists turned to it to provide future remedies to prevent 
future ones. The dialogue and culture surrounding the League of Nations idea 
promoted the values of international peace and humanitarianism that was shared 
between intellectuals and the people alike.  
The turmoil and confusion in domestic politics in Britain after the war and the 
formation of new foreign and imperial politics as a result of Britain’s involvement in 
the League of Nations debate are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the end of the war 
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also signaled an end to foreign and political policies dominated by elitist debates. It 
was not only the beginning of the importance of public opinion in Britain’s 
international affairs but imperial affairs. Supported by an increasing awareness of a 
social instinct within each person, the familiar principles of civilization, 
internationalism, and liberalism in Britain were used to introduce a more sustainable 
vision of the British Empire. This vision not only could be compatible with a more 
interdependent global society, but it could more solidly connect the people of Britain 
with the empire. 
Imperialists argued that the League’s principles framed around 
internationalism and trusteeship struck a deeply embedded and familiar continuity in 
Britain’s humanitarian past. British policy focused less on only wedding social reform 
with imperialism to address mere reform of the physical health of the British people. 
Instead, they focused on the material and psychological wellbeing of everyone in the 
empire through education. By doing so, British officials could mold and guide the 
social psychology and interests of the people in the British Empire to strive for 
imperial unity in spirit in light of increasing political and constitutional disunity.  
With all these changes after the First World War, there were strong pulls from 
many directions to recognize the importance of Britain’s own imperial continuity. 
The whole culture created around the League of Nations idea strongly advocated fr 
the development of a deep historical sense of one’s national history for the ultimate 
success of the League of Nations. As one League of Nations supporter would 
exclaim, “we have got to build internationalism upon nationalism.”183 For the British 
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people, this continuity could be found in the British constitution and in the 
international humanitarian reforms intending to improve the social and economic 
wellbeing of everyone in the British Empire and at home.  
League of Nations supporters in Britain tried—albeit not very successfully—
to reconcile imperial unity with a recognition that people instinctively had strong 
attachments to local interests and national interests. Yet there were disparitie  
between the intentions of the League’s principles that tied up in its idea of 
“civilization” with the average Britisher’s assumptions about their place in the 
empire. Often, postwar imperial policies were still influenced by residual prejudices, 
fears, and group interests that stymied any whole-hearted commitment to “self-
government” to its non-white territories within the empire.  
In conclusion, the widespread influence of the League of Nations idea on the 
politics and culture of Empire in Britain after the First World War is a scarcely 
explored area of historical research. While many scholars have touched on the 
particularly “imperial” nature of the League of Nations, none have explored how the 
League of Nations, an actualization of liberal internationalism, helped redefin  a 
liberal empire that had virtually lost all its “liberal” and constitutional moorings. 
Without exploring the League’s popular and ideological influences on not only 
British high politics, but also domestic politics, our knowledge of the changing tactics 
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